Kenya and the ICC: the politics of the 2007 post-election violence by Fromet De Rosnay, Amandine
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
 Kenya and the ICC 
The Politics of the 2007 Post-Election Violence 
Amandine Fromet de Rosnay, FRMAMA004. 
A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the 
degree of MPhil in Transitional Justice and Conflict Resolution. 
COMPULSORY DECLARATION 
This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award 
of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation 
in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, 
and has been cited and referenced. 
 
Signature:        Date:  
Faculty of Humanities 
University of Cape Town 
2012 
Kenya and the ICC 
 2 
Chapter 1:  Introduction ...................................................................... 4 
1.1 Concepts and Definitions ................................................................................................................... 5 
1.1.1 Accountability: The Politics of Choices ....................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Literature Review .............................................................................................................................. 17 
1.3 Chapter Outline ................................................................................................................................... 19 
Chapter 2:  Historical Background ...................................................... 20 
2.1 A Patrimonial System ....................................................................................................................... 21 
2.1.1 Patronage .............................................................................................................................................. 21 
2.2 Ethnicity and Resource Competition: Majimbo Manipulated .......................................... 29 
2.3 Impunity: Accountability, Trials and Tribulations ............................................................... 34 
2.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 40 
Chapter 3:  Kenya’s Political Landscape ............................................. 43 
3.1 In the Long Term ................................................................................................................................ 43 
3.1.1 A Fragmented Political Environment ....................................................................................... 43 
3.1.2 Political Parties and Their Ethnic Constituencies ............................................................... 46 
3.1.3 Maintaining the Status Quo ........................................................................................................... 48 
3.2 In the Short Term ............................................................................................................................... 50 
3.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 56 
Chapter 4:  The Internationalisation of the Transitional Process ........ 58 
4.1 Negotiators: The First Internationals ........................................................................................ 59 
4.2 Negotiators: NGOs.............................................................................................................................. 61 
4.2.1 The NGO-isation of Kenya .............................................................................................................. 61 
4.2.2 The Growth of NGOs .......................................................................................................................... 62 
4.2.3 The NGO sector in the Kenyan Mediation ............................................................................... 65 
4.3 Negotiators: The African Union .................................................................................................... 67 
4.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 70 
Chapter 5:  Kenya’s Way .................................................................... 71 
5.1 Mediation Strategies ......................................................................................................................... 72 
5.1.1 A Paradox ............................................................................................................................................... 72 
5.1.2 Mediation: Wording .......................................................................................................................... 73 
5.2 Legacies of the Past ........................................................................................................................... 75 
5.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 76 
 
Kenya and the ICC 
 3 
Chapter 6:  The International Criminal Court ..................................... 78 
6.1 Failure to Establish the Special Tribunal ................................................................................. 78 
6.2 Actors and their Interests ............................................................................................................... 83 
6.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 88 
Chapter 7:  Conclusion ....................................................................... 90 
Bibliography ....................................................................................... 95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kenya and the ICC 
 4 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
In December 2007, Kenya held a presidential election. The incumbent was 
Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU). His political opponent was 
Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The vote was peaceful 
and described by many in positive terms; that is, a continuation of the positive 
democratic transition that Kenya began toward the end of the 1990s.1 However, 
many in Kenya accused the government of foul play, when the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK) delayed declaring a winner for two days.  The ECK 
eventually declared Kibaki President, and rushed the swearing-in ceremony, 
skipping the stipulated 72 hours.2 Two days after declaring Kibaki president, 
Samuel Kivuitu, the chair of the ECK, admitted he did not know whether Kibaki 
had won the elections.3 He insisted that he had agreed to release the results and 
announce Kibaki as president, under pressure from above. 4  Kenya then 
experienced its worst bout of violence since the Mau Mau rebellion, before 
independence. The Post-Election Violence (PEV) lasted two months. It was 
resolved following an agreement, the Kenya National and Reconciliation 
Dialogue (KNDR), negotiated by a Panel of Eminent Personalities. The fighting 
parties agreed to form a Government of National Unity (GNU), a Commission of 
Enquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) and an Independent Review 
Commission on the General elections (Kriegler Commission). The GNU was to 
have Kibaki reinstated as President, to add the post of Prime Minister for Odinga, 
and was to undertake a reconciliation and accountability process, prosecuting 
perpetrators.   
 
This thesis seeks to determine what were the politics that led Kenya to prosecute 
those who bore greatest responsibility for the PEV. More specifically, what were 
                                                        
1
 Wangari Mathaai, The Challenge for Africa. (London: Arrow Books, 2009).  
2  
Ibid.  
3
 Nelson Kasfir, “Neo-Patrimonialism, Power Sharing and Reform in Kenya” (paper presented at 
the Third European Conference on African Studies, Leipzig, June 6, 2009). 
4
 Steve Snow, “Unhindered by the rule of law: ethnic terrorism and the 2007 Kenyan presidential 
election,” South African Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2009): 115-127.  
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the politics that resulted in selecting the ICC, as the court where individuals were 
going to be held accountable? 
1.1 Concepts and Definitions 
 
Kenya made a surprising choice by undertaking a retributive justice 
process. By agreeing to two commissions of enquiries into the PEV and ECK, 
Kenya committed itself to achieving accountability for its governing elite.5 The 
stated aim was that it would end impunity and aid the democratic process of 
Kenya.6 However, Kenya’s system of governance, as will be explored in detail, 
performs in a way in which the possibility of accountability and thus of losing 
power, presents a real danger for many in the political elite. Furthermore, 
because the GNU was the result of a negotiated settlement with many of the old 
guard present, achieving accountability in such a situation is a difficult political 
choice to make. It is therefore puzzling that Kenya would go beyond achieving 
negative peace7, and instead pursue an extensive and punitive Transitional 
Justice (TJ) programme.  
 
A TJ process is a relatively new approach to achieving justice and ensuring peace 
in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression. Roht-Arriaza defines 
it as “that set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period 
of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and 
dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law”.8  It is 
concerned with achieving national reconstruction and good governance. 9 The 
goals are to heal victims and alter the conditions that allowed dictatorship, in 
                                                        
5
 Godfrey M. Musila, “Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya: Autonomy and the Challenge of 
External Prescriptions,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (2009): 445-464.  
6
 Tim Murithi, “Situation Report: Kenya – A year after the crisis: The Quest for Electoral Reform 
and Transitional Justice”, Institute for Security Studies (2009), accessed June 11, 2012, 
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SITREPKENYA160109.PDF.  
7
 Negative peace may be defined as the absence of direct violence.  
8
 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The new landscape of transitional justice”, in Transitional justice in the 
twenty-first century: beyond truths versus justice, eds. Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2.  
9
 KHRC, “Transitional Justice in Kenya: A toolkit for training and engagement” (2010): 14, 
accessed June 15, 2012, http://www.khrc.or.ke/resources/publications/doc_download/7-transitional-
justice-in-kenya-a-toolkit-for-training-and-engagement.html. 
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order to prevent its return.10 With an inherently difficult environment, the 
challenge is to put together policies and processes that will allow a new regime 
to govern with legitimacy. 
 
Retributive justice focuses on judicial tools such as prosecutions and trials, and 
may include lustration and vetting. Restorative justice on the other hand is 
directed toward truth commissions, documentation, reparations, and can include 
institutional and judicial reforms. The former is thus associated with ending 
impunity and achieving legal justice. The latter tends to be associated with 
reconciling societies and healing emotional and psychological wounds.11 Today, 
the need for an approach that uses a combination of these is being increasingly 
recognised, although their conflicting objectives and lack of compatibility may at 
times be problematic without clearly mapped-out policies.12  
A TJ process has a number of tools and mechanisms at its disposition, which have 
been developed, and continue to evolve through either international law or 
practice in the field. These mechanisms can be legal or non-legal in nature, 
aiming at punishing the perpetrator or satisfying and rehabilitating the victim. 
They can be directed toward the individual or the collective, and can be dealt 
with at the domestic or international level.13 
1.1.1 Accountability: The Politics of Choices 
 
For Kritz, any TJ programme has four basic objectives. It is implemented 
to (1) determine the truth by establishing a record of human rights violations in 
order to validate victims (2) achieve justice, (3) undertake democratic reforms 
with the entrenchment of the rule of law in working institutions, and (4) build 
                                                        
10
 Tina Rosenberg, “Overcoming the Legacies of Dictatorship,” Foreign Affairs 134 (1995): 134-
152. 
11
 Roht-Arriaza, “The new landscape.”  
12
 Rosemary Nagy, “Transitional Justice as Global Project: critical reflections,” Third World 
Quarterly 29, no. 2 (February 2008): 275-289.  
13
 Ibid. 
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durable peace.14 However, it is important to acknowledge that the notion of TJ 
remains to a certain extent elusive, as the concept allows for multiple and elastic 
interpretations regarding the extent of these objectives.15 The debate ranges 
from those who believe TJ is a process that allows countries to immediately ‘start 
over’ on a clean slate and others who believe that this notion of closure is not 
achieved so easily.16 Proponents of TJ17 argue that history has shown that 
unaddressed abuses generate distrust between groups affecting the state’s 
capabilities and institutions.18 The International Centre for Transitional Justice 
argues that in most countries with records of abuse and impunity, victims’ 
demands for justice refuse to go away.19 Furthermore, continued impunity raises 
questions about the commitment of governments to the rule of law, and gives the 
message that political figures are above and beyond the law, potentially leading 
to cyclical recurrences of violence.20 Thus, justice is highlighted as one of TJ’s 
most important aspects in the international community.  
Being concerned with the politics that surrounded Kenya’s accountability 
process, it is important to look at what determines the choice of these processes. 
In answering this question, a number of variables will be analysed, including the 
balance of power; levels of complicity with crimes of the past regime; and the 
legacies left behind. 
1.1.1.1  Why does a state choose retributive above restorative 
justice or amnesia?  
 
Tina Rosenberg compares the transitions of countries in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe. The author identifies four variables that affect the choices 
                                                        
14
 Neil Kritz, “Policy implementation od Empirical Research on Transitional Justice.” In Assessing 
the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research, ed. Hugo Van der Merwe, 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009): 13-21.  
15
 Nagy, “Transitional Justice as Global Project.” 
16
 Dean Peachey, “The elusive quest for reconciliation in Northern Uganda,” in Critical 
Perspectives in Transitional Justice, eds. Phil Clark et al. (Cambridge: Intersentia, forthcoming).  
17
 It is important to note that scholarship of TJ is dominantly Western based.  
18
 Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2002), 3-22, 53-86. 
19
 ICTJ. “What is Transitional Justice?” accessed May 25, 2012, http://ictj.org/about/transitional-
justice. 
20
 Ibid.  
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for TJ: ideology if and when present, the nature of repression, co-operation with 
tyranny, political legacies and the extent of the ‘urge to purge’.21 Ideology is 
relevant mostly to the communist bloc of Eastern Europe, whose regimes were 
held together by the idea of the rise of the proletariat. In Latin America, the 
military regimes relied on guns instead. 
Concerning the nature of repression, Rosenberg assesses that in Eastern Europe, 
it was diffuse while in Latin America it was deep22. In other words, while in the 
communist bloc few people suffered physical harm, almost everyone suffered 
some deprivation. This required the cooperation of the entire population, as it 
involved an entire bureaucracy. Thus, by virtue of living under communism, 
everyone participated in repression, resulting in a criminal regime. 23 
Contrastingly, in Latin America, the atrocities committed had clear victims and 
clear and identifiable perpetrators, resulting in a regime of criminals.24  
The legacies left by these regimes also differed. In Eastern Europe, the state after 
the transition was still too strong and prone to abuses of political power. This 
was coupled with a population that had had 45 years to accustom itself to a 
government capable of arbitrary power, and which twisted the law for political 
ends. Their legacy therefore, is a strong state that seeks harsh measures to 
restore the past, a population that is unsure of its role vis-à-vis its government 
and finally a lack of judicial and civil institutions to rein in leaders.25 Contrarily, 
Latin American countries have inherited a weak state that is too limited to 
impose the appropriate checks and balances on the military. The military 
retained its gun power post-transition, and retained the support of influential 
members of the elite.26  
These variables, according to Rosenberg, determine the type of punishment 
handed out by the new government in power. Accordingly, although trials are 
                                                        
21
 Rosenberg, “Overcoming the Legacies.” 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid.  
26
 Ibid. 
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crucial for democracies, they are seldom attempted27. In Eastern Europe the new 
state was strong, however retributive justice was not attempted. This would 
have required holding an entire population, which had been in some way or 
another complicit with the communist regime, responsible. In Latin American 
countries with clear perpetrators, trials would have been easier than in Easter 
Europe, but were only attempted in the case of Argentina; whose President Raul 
Alfonsin ended the trials after three military uprisings. Thus, in most cases with 
states too weak to control the military, trials would equate political suicide.28  
 
Huntington concurs with this analysis as he states: “Officials of strong 
authoritarian regimes that voluntarily ended themselves were not prosecuted, 
officials of weak authoritarian regimes that collapsed were punished if they were 
promptly prosecuted”.29 While the former gave themselves amnesties, the latter 
did not yield enough power to prevent prosecutions. In transitions negotiated 
with a powerful opposition, amnesty is often part of the bargain. Thus according 
to Huntington, the implementation of retributive justice depends on the balance 
of power and the bargaining powers of the incoming regime.30 Because the old 
guard have the potential of producing a backlash and a return to violence, 
Vinjamuri argues that new regimes will be, and ought to be risk averse in the 
name of keeping the peace.31  
 
Pion-Berlin adds another variable that he considers influences the decision on 
whether to pardon or punish. According to him, it is important to consider elite 
preference, and their predisposition to chose punishment over pardon.32 He 
argues that this is affected by two sets of relationships, that of the leader and his 
                                                        
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave – Democratisation in the late twentieth century (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 228. 
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Jack L. Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies 
of International Justice,” International Security 28, no. 3, (2003): 5–44. 
32
 David Pion-Berlin, “To prosecute or to pardon? Human rights decisions in the Latin American 
Southern cone,” in Transitional Justice – how emerging democracies reckon with former regimes, ed. 
Neil Kritz (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), 82-103.  
Kenya and the ICC 
 10 
political party, and that of the leader and his constituency. Leaders will have to 
balance the needs and promises of both relationships before making a choice.33  
 
Elster’s hierarchy of motivation may help to explain how a leader may rank these 
needs and preferences. He argues that motivations for achieving accountability 
can be understood as those belonging to reason; the decision to be just, interest; 
such as the will of parties to increase their share of the electorate and emotion, 
such as the need to seem just in order to hide envy, vanity or revenge.34 These 
often exist in a hierarchy of motivations, where actors might first be motivated 
by self-interest (first-order motivation) and then by reason (meta-motivation). 
Often, actors will go to great lengths to create strategies that satisfy both their 
first-order motivation and meta-motivation at the same time. For the incoming 
regime, this can often be seen in the tension between wanting to differentiate 
themselves from the old regime and the desire to punish.35  
 
Applying the rule of law to its TJ process and being ready to use it for the highest 
echelons of the political elite for trials is a process that depends on the influence 
of the old guard, the popular complicity in past atrocities, and the political costs 
and benefits of cooperation for the political elite.36 The ability to punish is 
extremely rare as it depends on the outright victory of the new regime, the 
ability to identify perpetrators and victims, as well as the leaders’ preferences 
and predisposition to punishment.  
 
1.1.1.2  What role do international actors play in the choice of 
retributive over restorative justice or amnesia?  
 
 Because of the political difficulty of imposing trials, the international 
community is often asked to help, or intervenes and imposes trials in the name of 
                                                        
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Elster, Jon. Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Brian Grodsky, “International Prosecutions and Domestic Politics: The Use of Truth 
Commissions as Compromise Justice in Serbia and Croatia,” International Studies Review 11, no. 4 
(2009): 687. 
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achieving justice and establishing long-lasting peace.37 It is therefore imperative 
on the one hand, to understand the interplay between the local and international 
actors in such situations. This interaction will affect the balance of power locally, 
and invariably influence and often determine the choices of TJ mechanisms. On 
the other hand, it is also important to look at the motives of the international 
community in intervening in such situations. 
  
Internationally imposed forms of retributive justice can be administered through 
ad hoc tribunals, such as the one for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.38 Alternatively, 
justice can be administered through hybrid special tribunals, such as in Sierra 
Leone, or through the ICC. The latter can only be used as a court of last resort, 
which is when a state is either unable or unwilling to bring perpetrators of gross 
human rights violations to justice.39 According to Snyder and Vinjamuri, these 
types of tribunals are meant to combine the expertise of the international 
community and the legitimacy of local actors.40 According to Grodsky, the 
advantage of international pressure for prosecution lies in its ability to produce 
space for trials that would otherwise not have occurred. It creates conditions for 
justice when domestic courts are short of resources or legitimacy, by providing 
the counterweight to pressure the impunity-seeking elites of the previous 
order.41 
 
 In the rare situations in which a transition is achieved through a negotiated 
settlement resulting in a power sharing arrangement, such as in Kenya, the new 
government will include members from both the old and the new regimes. In 
such a case, there is the additional task for the new regime to govern with the 
old, while at the same time remaining legitimate in the eyes of the electorate. 
With the help of the international community in achieving accountability, the old 
                                                        
37
 Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts : The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of 
a Prior Regime,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (1991): 2537-2615.  
38
 Voss, Elena, Arm kolas, Ionise. “Transitional Justice in Practice: The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Beyond”. UNISCI. Vol. 18, 2008. 
39
 Raub Lindsey. “Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice”. International 
Law and Politics 41, no.1013 (2009): 1013-1054.  
40
 Snyder and Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors”, 5-44. 
41
 Luc Huyse, “Justice after Transition : On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with 
the Past,” Law & Society Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1995): 51-78.  
Kenya and the ICC 
 12 
guard is less likely to be perceived as political revanchists.42 Additionally, a form 
of accountability that is spread across the board allows the old regime to ‘show’ 
that its human rights violations were justified by the actions of the opposition 
thus keeping their credibility in the eyes of the electorate.43 These reasons, as 
well as the responsibility of states to protect citizens from human rights abuses 
from their government (R2P), are often provided to justify the international 
community’s intervention in TJ processes.  
 
However, retributive justice is also where pressure from the international 
community is most controversial and problematic. One of the major issues of 
internationally imposed forms of justice is dealing with differing levels of 
domestic compliance.44 Compliance with international justice will usually result 
in various political domestic challenges. This may then alter the dynamics of 
domestic TJ policy by producing unexpected and contradictory political effects.45 
This is especially true when internationally imposed forms of justice change the 
local balance of power. 
 
Consequently, in a bid to balance conflicting tensions, new regimes employ a 
number of strategies in order to try and placate on the one hand, the victims and 
the international community asking for justice, and on the other hand the 
potential spoilers.46 States will employ ‘window dressing’ strategies to appease 
international pressure, e.g. by making cosmetic changes to their domestic 
practices.47 As a result, when the international community imposes justice in 
cases with low levels of domestic compliance, it will have two main 
consequences. First, because accountability may have the effect of further 
destabilising the country, states will attempt to find ways to please both their 
constituencies and the international community. Secondly, where there is a high 
level of complicity in past crimes, or when a high number of members of the 
                                                        
42
 Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts”; Grodsky, “International Prosecutions.” 
43
 Jon Elster, “Closing the Books”. 
44
 Jelena Subotic, “The Paradox of International Justice Compliance,” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (2009): 362-383. 
45
 Grodsky, “International Prosecutions”; Subotic, “The Paradox.” 
46
 Subotic, “The Paradox.” 
47
 Grodsky, “International Prosecutions.” 
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former regime are still in government, the state may resort to the political 
manipulation of international justice. As Grodsky states, “leaders are as likely to 
jump on the ‘justice wagon’ as they are to attempt to hijack it.” 48 
 
1.1.1.3  The ICC 
 
The ICC, the highest criminal court in the world, was created on the 1st 
July 2002 through the Rome Statute49. It was established to be an independent 
judicial institution, which would try perpetrators of crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and war crimes when states are unwilling or unable to carry out 
domestic trials.50 However, despite initial optimism the ICC quickly became 
entwined in controversy. International and African scholars of both political and 
legal backgrounds have criticised the court’s founding document, the Rome 
Statute, the court’s claim of universality, its prosecutor and judges, its apparent 
focus on Africa, its domination by the EU and the influential role of the US 
despite its refusal to become a member of the ICC.51 Hoile dubs it “the 
Guantanamo bay of Europe”52, or a Western imperialist tool against the African 
continent. This section will focus on the politicisation of the court, and the use of 
its institution to serve the interests of those that dominate it: the EU and the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council (SC). The ICC also serves the 
interest of politicians, seeking to remove opponents, whose own states are being 
investigated by the court.53  
 
First, the court’s independence is brought into question due to its ties to the SC 
and its five permanent members. The ICC cannot be deemed an independent and 
impartial court as articles 13(b) and 16 of the ICC statute grant ‘prosecutorial’ 
                                                        
48
 Grodsky, “International Prosecutions,” 688. 
49
 ICC, “About the Court,” accessed November 12, 2012, www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/ICC/About+the+Court/. 
50
 Ibid.  
51
 David Hoile, “The International Criminal Court: Europe’s Guantanamo Bay?” Africa Research 
Centre (2010), accessed November 12, 2012, 
http://www.africaresearchcentre.org/files/ICC.Europe%27s.Guantanamo.Bay.pdf. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. 
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rights to the SC to refer or defer an ICC investigation or prosecution.54 Because of 
this, the ICC automatically depends on the will and whims of the UK, France, 
Russia, the US, and China; the irony being that two of these members, namely 
China and the USA are not members of the ICC. Yet these states have the power 
to decide which cases get attention and which get to be ignored. This essentially 
means that the most powerful governments of the world have the power to 
shield certain states from the court’s jurisdiction, while using it to pursue their 
own political agendas.55  
 
A good example of this is the attitude of the US and the UK toward Sudan’s 
President Omar Al-Bashir’s indictment by the ICC. The Bush administration had 
made an offer to Sudan to halt ICC proceedings if Sudan agreed to the 
deployment of UN troops in Darfur.56 Similarly, it was revealed that the UK while 
publicly supporting Bashir’s indictment actually saw it as ‘unhelpful’ to peace 
making, and at best providing some leverage for South Sudan’s independence.57 
Thus as noted by The Economist, “that may be clever diplomacy, but it does 
nothing for the ICC’s credibility to be seen as a pawn in a foreign power’s chess 
game”.58 In fact, it was for this very reason that India, the world’s biggest 
democracy, had rejected the Rome statute as it provided a way out for those 
accused of serious crimes but with influence in the UN body.59 Indeed, powerful 
states have thus far avoided prosecutions and victims of serious international 
crimes in Burma, Gaza, Iraq, or Afghanistan have been denied justice.60  
 
Secondly, the ICC is financially and institutionally dependent on the EU. It was 
the EU and EU funded NGOs that brought the ICC into existence.61 Not only was it 
                                                        
54
 John Rosenthal, “A lawless Global Court. How the International Criminal Court undermines the 
U.N. system,” Policy Review 123 (February/March 2004), accessed August 9, 2012, 
www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3439981.html. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Mahmood Mamdani, Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the war on terror (New York: 
Pantheon, 2009).  
57
 The Economist, “The ICC and Africa: Dim Prospects” (February, 2011), accessed August 6, 
2012, www.economist.com/node/18176088/print. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Hoile, “The International Criminal Court.” 
60
 Bernard Schiff, Building the ICC (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
61
 Hoile, “The International Criminal Court.” 
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created on the behest of the EU, but the majority of its funding comes from the 
EU. In 2009, the organisation provided for 60% of the court’s funding, and the 
most dominant62 EU countries paid 44% of that budget.63 Furthermore, in 2006 
the EU-ICC co-operation and assistance agreement64 formally tied the EU to the 
ICC, obliging cooperation between the two entities. The ICC stated that it hoped 
the exchange of classified information would further strengthen the EUs 
relationship with the ICC. In fact, the EU has admitted to sharing secret 
intelligence information with regards to the Sudan and DRC cases with the ICC.65 
The EU is also the biggest promoter of the court, often demanding that it be 
placed on the agenda of several of its meetings across the world, especially with 
those states that have not ratified it yet. 
 
Bourguignon noted, “The willingness to globally support international justice 
through the ICC is a bold initiative that supports the EU’s effectiveness as a 
diplomatic actor…” 66 The EU can use the Court as a tool to increase its influence 
and soft power in the international justice arena. As such, the ICC has been made 
part of the EU’s policies.67 For instance, the EU had threatened to withhold 
economic assistance from African Caribbean and Pacific members of the Cotonou 
Agreement68, who did not take a pro-ICC stance. Yet, at the same time, the EU 
denounced the US for using the ICC as a pawn, when the US sought to suspend 
economic support to ICC state parties who refused bilateral immunity 
agreements.69 
 
Finally, another result of the ICCs vulnerability, probably unforeseen by the EU, 
has been the political abuse of its institution by those who seek its involvement. 
                                                        
62
 Germany, the UK, France and Italy. 
63
 Hoile, “The International Criminal Court.” 
64
 European Commission, “Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European 
Union and assistance”, Council Directive 2006/28, OJ L115/50 (April 10, 2006), accessed June 10, 
2012, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/6EB80CC1-D717-4284-9B5C-
03CA028E155B/140157/ICCPRES010106_English.pdf. 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 Michael Bourguignon, “The EU and the ICC: Wedding bells?”, Eurosduvillage (January 2008), 
accessed July 25, 2012, www.theeuros.eu/The-EU-and-the-ICC-Wedding-belss. 
67
 Hoile, “The International Criminal Court.” 
68
 Trade agreement between the EU, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP 
countries) 
69
 Ibid.  
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A point in case is Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni who deferred his country 
to the ICC, asking it to take care of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA)’s problem. 
One issue is that Uganda has the judicial capabilities of trying the LRA members 
(once caught), and is willing to do so.70 The question therefore is whether the ICC 
has the right to be involved there. It also sets forth a precedent whereby such a 
state would then “wash its own hands of an insoluble internal problem” using the 
resources of another institution.71 Many have noted that it looks like Museveni 
asked for the ICC intervention, as it was politically beneficial. Firstly, Museveni 
was able to present himself as the humanitarian in the international legal 
community and was acclaimed by the Western human rights industry.72 
Furthermore, the self-referral was announced in a joint conference with both 
Museveni and ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo present. This meant that the 
latter was perceived as being manipulated by Museveni and his government, 
which was itself party to the conflict. In the same token, Museveni was also able 
to avert the eyes of the international community and the ICC from the crimes of 
his own government, whose military forces have been the cause for internal 
displacement and extrajudicial killing, especially in the northern region of the 
Acholi people.73 This further entrenched the perception of the ICC’s partiality, 
and that it was being used as a tool by the Ugandan government against the LRA.  
 
To sum-up, Thakur concludes how an initiative that was created to protect 
vulnerable individuals is instead being used as an instrument of power against 
vulnerable countries.74 Rosenthal goes further and states that “the ICC is not 
merely a matter of good intention gone awry in the face of stubborn political 
realities…The ICC… has been made to be abused.”75 
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1.2 Literature Review  
 
It is apparent that electoral violence is a recent topic in the study of 
international relations and conflict. As such, there has been an increase in the 
amount of academic writing on the topic, with a specific interest on the African 
continent. This also holds true for TJ, where Latin America and Africa have been 
in focus, and the historic South African transition, which is often suggested as the 
template to be followed in other countries. This thesis situates itself in this field, 
and as such hopes to contribute to it. 
 
Much of the literature on Kenya surrounds the events of the 2007 election, and 
the violence that accompanied it. This literature investigates the political and 
ethnic manipulation that took place before and after the election. As stipulated 
by the KNDR, there were empirical investigations conducted into the type of 
violence committed, and the likely perpetrators. This has revealed a system of 
governance reliant on impunity dating back to the colonial times, which was 
perpetuated under Jomo Kenyatta and especially under Daniel Arap Moi. This is 
supported by other reports76, which have been written up for previous failed 
attempts at truth commissions, regarding human rights abuses and monetary 
scandals under these previous regimes. 
 
There is also literature that is more concerned with the transitional justice 
aspects of Kenya’s future, which has taken a deeper look into Kenya’s justice 
options.77 Authors such as Godfrey Musila,78 show that the failure to establish a 
coherent approach toward achieving justice has hampered these processes. This 
he highlights, may have been caused by efforts by the political elite to “capture 
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the debate” and their “silencing of important voices”. Many scholars79 have 
shown concerns about the international community’s involvement in Kenya, 
especially the ICC, without its actions being complemented with local 
approaches.  
 
In addition, there are also a number of primary sources, mostly in the form of 
reports, 80  which have followed up Kenya’s supposed transition after the 
2007/08 negotiations. Because the international and East African communities 
are concerned about Kenya’s future, especially as the country is the economic 
powerhouse of the region, there has been much scrutiny surrounding the Kenyan 
government’s actions. A survey of the literature shows that Kenya has had a long 
history of political manipulation, corruption, and impunity.81 Jacqueline Klopp 
and Tim Murithi seem to show that Kenya’s actions, or rather inactions to follow 
up with CIPEV’s recommendations to set up a Special Tribunal (ST) may be due 
to similar reasons.82  
 
Due to the fact that this thesis is concerned with more recent and on-going event 
than have been discussed in most of the literature, it has had to deal with a 
dearth of academic writing and evidence on the subject. The challenge has been 
to find the appropriate amount of resources to sustain some of the empirical 
statements made within. In an effort to alleviate this problem, this thesis has 
made critical use of many non-academic sources such as the press, blogs, 
YouTube, wikileaks cables, and other social-media sites. 
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1.3 Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter 2 highlights the political attributes that have existed pre-independence 
and that were perpetuated by Kenya’s leaders, explaining the underlying themes 
that make up the system of governance. This will help to explain the origins of 
the PEV as well as the reactions of the political elite to the proposed solutions. 
  
Chapter 3 analyses the Kenyan political system in order to explain the decision-
making processes of the governing elite and the environment in which they act. 
It will show that the Transitional Justice process was motivated by political 
calculations and strategies rather than by the desire to end impunity. 
 
Chapter 4 looks at the internationalisation of the PEV-case and its mediation. In 
light of the discussed difficulties with international intervention, this chapter will 
answer why the Kenyan government allowed it to happen, and why the 
international community were so eager to intervene.  
 
Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the seemingly paradoxical choice that the 
Kenyan governing elite made by setting up CIPEV and allowing retributive 
justice to be incorporated into the KNDR agreement. Three topics will be 
discussed: mediation strategies, wording, and interpretation of the KNDR, and 
the legacies of the past.  
 
Chapter 6 will shed light on the political manoeuvring that led to the failure to 
establish the Special Tribunal, leading to the involvement of the ICC. In order to 
do this we will highlight the various and opposing interests of some of the more 
prominent politicians.  
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Chapter 2  Historical Background 
 
To understand Kenya’s current political system it is essential to see the 
origin of its underlying features and how they developed thereafter. The aim of 
this chapter is to portray a system of governance that finds its roots in pre-
independence Kenya, and that has since then dictated the way the country has 
been ruled. It will be shown how three related attributes can help to explain the 
PEV, the government’s attitudes toward the Transitional Justice process and 
accountability, and the resulting crisis of legitimacy that Kenya subsequently 
experienced.  
 
The first attribute to be highlighted is a system of governance that is dependent 
on patrimonialism or clientelism. This is defined herewith as a relationship 
between the patron and the client, whereby the patron has political power, and 
the client receives ‘goods’ and protection in exchange for political loyalty.83 It 
will be seen how British indirect rule helped to construct this type of 
relationship. The result of this is a system of governance that decides, “who is to 
eat, what is to be consumed and who is to be excluded”.84 
 
The second attribute highlighted is the competition for resources based on 
ethnicity, caused by the construction of a dominant ethnic group that kept close 
to political power for the resources it provided. This produced grievances in 
minority groups, and often resulted in ethnic strife, which is seen throughout 
Kenya’s history but epitomised by the PEV. This section aims to show how the 
manipulation of Majimbo, initially a reform movement, which sprang from the 
negotiations leading to independence calling for provincial autonomy, was used 
for political gains.  
 
                                                        
83
 Crawford Young, “The End of the Post-colonial State in Africa? Reflections on changing African 
political dynamics,” African Affairs 103, no. 410 (2004): 23-49. 
84
 Susanne Mueller, “Government and Opposition in Kenya,” in Our turn to Eat, politics in Kenya 
since 1950, eds. Daniel Branch, Nic Cheeseman and Leigh Gardner (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010), 52. 
 
Kenya and the ICC 
 21 
Lastly, this chapter will show how impunity is necessary, in order for the 
previously mentioned attributes to be sustained. This is especially true in light of 
the nature of economic crimes committed by the post independence regime. 
Impunity protects networks of patronage, and therefore their political power, as 
well as certain individuals from reformists.  
2.1 A Patrimonial System  
2.1.1 Patronage 
 
The clientelist networks in Kenya historically find their roots in the 
colonial days of British indirect rule, which used the co-optation of the African 
elite to help govern the masses.85 This system of governance and the institutions 
that supported it was perpetuated post-independence and characterised by the 
illegal grabbing and trading of land. 86  As land diminished, clientelism was 
further perpetuated under Presidents Moi and Kibaki, who used the allocation of 
government posts, and dubious state investments.87 Branch and Cheeseman link 
this to the colonial idea that it is within the state’s responsibility to provide for 
the means of production, resulting in a statist economy vulnerable to state 
predation.88  
 
To understand the nature of the current political system and the origins and 
sources of patronage, one must look back at the legacies left by the colonial state. 
As Young contends, the nature of colonialism in Africa had some unique features 
that cannot be ignored. 89  The process of colonialism itself was highly 
competitive, and was conducted via the doctrine of ‘effective occupation’.90 Since 
these colonies had to be profitable, it meant that Africa had to pay for its own 
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subjugation.91 Under indirect rule, this was achieved through the co-optation of 
chiefs, whose appointments were dependent on education rather than their 
position as customary chiefs. Their loyalty was effectively bought by the state, in 
exchange for a position in the state and thus better access to resources. This 
resulted in a ‘command state’, whereby even though the colonial super-structure 
was modest it still achieved uncontested hegemony.92 This was coupled with the 
belief that the state needed to control and manage the economy to achieve 
modernity.  
 
Mueller concurs, arguing that Kenya’s sources of patronage and authoritarianism 
must be understood in the context of these colonial legacies.93 Kenya by 
independence had inherited a centralised administration that served as the arm 
of the executive, a politically impotent legislature, and civil services that were 
given the power to control opposition countrywide. This had been designed to 
coerce, monopolise resources, maintain law and order, and repress and 
discourage dissidents.94 The increase of authoritarianism and the banning of 
political parties during the state of emergency declared in 1952 after the Mau 
Mau uprising was simply an elaboration of methods previously used. While the 
anti-colonial struggle was against the white domination of Kenya, it was not 
against the system itself. Consequently, there was a transfer of much of the 
colonial system of governance to the post-independence government. 95 
 
Sixty years of authoritarian rule had created familiarity with that system of 
governance and resulted in a lack of experience with any alternative forms. After 
independence, this translated in attempts to create a black middle-class, which 
was tied to the state, because of the state’s monopoly over the means of 
production and distribution of resources, employment, and other economic 
rewards.96 There was an incentive to maintain these inherited structures, as the 
state was able to control the production and distribution of resources. This was 
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used to satisfy the clients of the political elite, whose loyalty they were 
dependent on for continued political hegemony.97 
 
2.1.1.1   Land as source of Patronage  
 
Land has been one of the main sources of patronage, especially under 
Kenyatta, and has been one of the major causes of grievance amongst the Kenyan 
population.98 It is argued that many of the land-related conflicts can be 
attributed to colonialism, which had imposed alien land-tenure regulations 
introducing concepts and legislation that were at odds with the traditional land-
tenure system.99 This combined with the important problems of population 
pressure on land reserved for Kenyans.100  
 
By the end of the 1950s as Kenya prepared for independence, a programme for 
the transfer of lands from European to African ownership was formulated under 
the One Million Acre Scheme. This was implemented from 1962 to 1967 and 
facilitated the Kenyan resettlement of some 1.17 million acres of land.101 Under 
the scheme, communities living adjacent to previously white owned farms would 
take ownership of the plots. This meant however, that it was the Kikuyu who 
were able to regain the fertile land of the Rift Valley. Kanyinga argues that this 
policy was primarily based on the need to appease the Kikuyu peasantry because 
of the threat they posed to the white farmers, and the recognition of the 
economic necessity of protecting European interests.102 This had started to 
shape the ethnic dimension of the land problem, as by focusing attention on 
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Kikuyu squatters, the government had failed to appreciate and recognise the 
Kalenjin, thus antagonising relationships between the two groups.103 
 
Additionally, this land was not to be given freely, but sold on a willing-buyer-
willing-seller basis. Far from being a fair and inclusive process, this benefited a 
burgeoning middle class and excluded local landless communities.104  This 
intensified both ethnic and class based competition, which the political elite used 
to improve their social bases of power, consolidating their political position as 
well as that of their ethnic group. For instance, the Ngwantaniro Company, 
formed in 1969 to help the landless Kikuyu, which ended up dominating the 
economy and politics of the Rift Valley after buying scores of land and increasing 
its membership to 30,000, drawn from the Kikuyu ethnic group.105 The company 
was so influential that the land control board could not deny applications for 
land purchase. Its chair Kihika Kimani became the MP for Nakuru North and 
effectively ran the Rift Valley.106 
 
Furthermore, land was illegally allocated to political affiliates as rewards for 
political loyalty.107 Land was sold at less than market value to allotted politicians 
and then sold to state corporations at amounts that far exceeded market 
values. 108 Government houses and properties were illegally allocated to 
individuals and companies. This practice lured members into Kenya African 
National Union (KANU), while economic and political punishment was used to 
scare those that defected to Kenya People’s Union (KPU).109 Dispensation of 
patronage explains the heavy regulatory framework and government 
involvement in the agricultural sector and legislature. This same technique was 
used under colonial rule to protect European settler farmers.110 
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While under Kenyatta land was concentrated in the hands of wealthy elements of 
the Kikuyu group (Kenyatta’s ethnic group),111 under Moi’s (a Kalenjin) era, this 
turned around as he attempted to curb Kikuyu capital and reinforce that of the 
Kalenjin, in an attempt to ensure his political dominance, hence feeding into the 
idea of ‘our turn to eat’. 112 The Ndungu Report113 reveals that not surprisingly, 
most of the illegal allocation of public land took place directly before or 
immediately after the multiparty elections of 1992, 1997 and 2002.114 Southall 
concludes that the “illegal appropriation of public land was to the formation and 
consolidation of Kenya’s political elite.” 115 
 
These illegal land grabbing took place against a backdrop of increasing 
population pressure on already scarce agricultural land. Whilst Kenya covers an 
area of approximately 582,646 sq. km. comprising of 97.8% land and 2.2% water 
surface, only 17% is fertile land.116 About 80% of the Kenyan population lives in 
rural areas and derive their livelihood from agriculture, meaning that access to 
agricultural land has implications for employment, income inequality as well as 
food security for the whole country. 117  By 1963, the imbalance between 
resources and the rate of population growth had already been noted. The lack of 
access, or ownership of land is considered one of the major causes of poverty in 
the country, and makes the issue of land use policy a critical one. However, policy 
has been so heavily influenced by patronage that appropriate policies are only 
considered at times of elections, and are forgotten as soon as power is 
attained.118  
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2.1.1.2   Financial corruption  
 
Although the land issue is considered by many to be the crux of Kenyans 
grievances, Kenya’s political elite did not limit themselves to land as source for 
patronage. Kasfir argues that Kenyatta was more dependent on his district and 
regional commissioners than on his party KANU. His supporters not only 
received land, but also jobs in the civil services with inflated salaries, often 
awarded for their loyalty.119 For instance, in 1964 when opposition party, 
Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU), folded and joined the governing party 
KANU, Kenyatta enticed the top echelon of the party with ministerial 
appointments.120 Through this patriarchal system of rule, Kenyatta managed to 
create a profitable system of governance, in its wake creating an embedded 
clientelist network within a dependent political economy.121  
 
Financial corruption was most rife under Moi and Kibaki. The threat of the 
removal of patrimonial benefits in cases of disloyalty has also been substantially 
used. Like Kenyatta, Moi’s ruling strategy was grounded in favouring his allies 
for key positions in the state and other profitable nongovernmental 
organisations.122 Moi’s task was however somewhat harder, as on the one hand, 
he faced a recalcitrant Kikuyu elite, who had tried to overthrow him before he 
took office, and on the other, his Kalenjin supporters, who wanted to ‘eat’.123 Moi 
attempted to satisfy the Kalenjin by extending his network of patronage to them. 
To achieve this he taxed and destroyed Kikuyu agricultural associations, 
assigned members of his own ethnic group in universities and replaced the 
elected Nairobi City Council with an appointed Commission in order to 
undermine Kikuyu control of the city.124 However, unlike Kenyatta, Moi had 
inherited a weakening economy and was running out of patronage sources. This 
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exposed the weakness of the Kenyan state and its leader, who found it 
increasingly difficult to govern without sufficient resources to buy loyalty.125  
 
As a result, Moi tightened his grip on the state apparatus and became 
increasingly authoritarian, amending the constitution to make Kenya a de jure 
one-party state. 126 The system of rewards was increasingly reversed and used to 
punish. The use of violence increased, as did the plundering of the state’s 
treasury. This resulted in the breakdown of any of the checks and balance of 
power and created fear amongst the population.127 The judiciary became an 
appendage of the executive, and those that did not conform suffered draconian 
penalties including torture and detention without trial. 128 
 
In addition to the weakening of the state and the toughening stance of Moi, there 
was a growing discomfort and distrust in Moi’s ability to deal with the economic 
crisis the country was facing in the 1990s. This was combined with increasing 
pressure from the international community’s financial institutions, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), who held back donor 
money intended for structural adjustment policies, which were based on the 
conditionality of good governance and transparency.129 Many argue that it is this 
weakening of the economy and involvement of international donors that led 
many to support a more competitive form of politics.130 The Kikuyu elite, whose 
loyalty the state could no longer buy, increasingly saw democratic reform as the 
only way in which their economic power could be translated into political 
power.131 
 
Many argue that with the weakening of the economy and opening of multi party 
democracy in Moi’s later years, clientelist networks actually grew in size.132 As 
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the regime ran out of resources to pilfer, it increasingly encroached upon the 
Central Bank as the remaining repository for patronage money.133 This type of 
fiscal corruption is best epitomised by the infamous Goldenberg scandal, which 
involved the embezzlement of $800 millions of government rebates for fake 
diamond and jewellery export.134  
 
In 2002, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which had been established 
between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) headed by Odinga and the National 
Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) headed by Kibaki won the presidency. The NARC 
promised that they would undertake reform, by promising devolution, and 
tackling the problem of corruption. However, the system of governance 
dependent on patronage was not abandoned. Kibaki has also been accused of 
favouring the Kikuyu from his area, commonly known as the Mount Kenya Mafia, 
and ignoring corruption within his inner circle.135 The lure of government 
employment increased especially as MPs could decide on their own salaries, 
which inflated to about $190,000 annually.136  
 
To summarise, this section has exposed the prominence of the ‘politics of the 
belly’ as being a fundamental part of the country’s system of governance. This 
system dates back to British indirect rule, whose authority depended on the 
loyalty of a small constructed African elite. While in 1963 Kenya won 
independence, it kept the tools and system of colonial rule. As such, although 
Kenyatta had a relatively inclusive one party state, he never prevented the 
favouritism of his Kikuyu allies.137 In fact, Kenyatta perpetuated it through the 
illegal allocation of fertile land. This system was further accentuated under Moi 
who set about replacing the Kikuyu elite with his own Kalenjin ethnic group. This 
was famously epitomised by a KANU MP who proclaimed, “Now is our turn to eat. 
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You Gikuyu [kikuyu] had yours”.138 When demands for patronage increased and 
the state capabilities to meet those decreased, it resulted in a combination of a 
weak state accompanied by an increasingly autocratic leader. The saying ‘our 
turn to eat’ had become so popular in Kenya that by the 2007 election year, many 
misinterpreted it to be ODM’s (headed by Odinga) official slogan.139 The 
government had become the most important driver of the accumulation process 
and dispenser of resources, so that control over the state became the main 
concern of politics.   
 
2.2 Ethnicity and Resource Competition: Majimbo Manipulated 
 
This section will show how ethnicity was constructed and used by the 
governing elite to determine who gets to eat. This section will explain how the 
notion of Majimbo, calling for autonomous provinces, was used to manipulate 
ethnicities. The manipulation of Majimbo will help to explain why it was 
considered imperative for individuals to vote for the leader that would guarantee 
their group’s access to the state. The fears of domination by one ethnicity has 
over the years been exacerbated and manipulated by the political elite as a 
means of controlling the state apparatus. 
 
As seen earlier, under indirect rule the co-optation of an African elite became the 
means to manipulate the distribution of resources, with the aim of creating a 
productive but subservient middle class. The exclusion from resource 
distribution had resulted in the infamous Mau Mau uprising at the end of the 
1950s. The rebellion had cost more than 10,000 lives140 and had resulted in the 
declaration of the state of emergency that was to last a decade. This resistance 
movement was a direct response to white settler farms in the Kikuyu land of the 
Rift Valley highlands. 141  In response to these grievances, the concept of 
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Majimboism promoted the idea of provincial autonomy for independent Kenya. 
The Majimbo state, would have kept the provincial boundaries created by the 
colonial government, which had been designed to keep ethnicities separated. 
Majimboism according to its proponents would allow provinces to govern 
themselves, thus avoiding ethnic competition and strife by safeguarding 
minorities.142 Majimbo was in essence a reform movement that hoped to 
minimise the system of governance that favoured certain groups to the 
detriment of the others.  
 
This movement involved a minority of the wealthier white settlers, who were 
looking to secure a relationship with the conservative African middle class with 
whom they hoped to share Kenya’s future. This was done to protect their 
commercial farms, as a decentralised constitution would safeguard minority 
rights.143 Communities that were host to various minority groups and migrants 
from other areas, who had come to work on white settler farms, also supported 
the Majimbo movement. A number of these migrants were also Kikuyu who had 
been pushed out of their homeland of Central Province by extreme land 
pressures. Many of these were the same labourers that had been the backbone of 
the Mau Mau revolt.144 Additionally, the newly formed party KADU,145 whose 
constituency was in parts of the Rift Valley and coastal areas, believed that a 
Majimboist constitution would be crucial to the party’s political survival. 
 
 As the Lancaster House Conferences146 were underway, KADU constantly 
defended regionalism as a first principle for the discussions. It soon became the 
key issue in their manifesto. However, with a cumbersome and heavy 
bureaucracy, the structure that KADU was proposing was seen as too costly and 
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difficult to implement.147 As a result, a compromise was found that would include 
regional constituencies in the constitution, but the exact composition of these 
constituencies would be organised after the negotiations. Consequently, when 
KANU won the national elections in 1963, it set about dismissing Majimboism 
and KADU as anti-nationalist and tribalist.148 As KADU’s position seemed to 
crumble, many, including future president Moi, crossed the floor to the winning 
party, resigned to the fact that it was better to be part of the new government 
than not at all.149 Unsurprisingly, in November 1964 the Majimboist constitution 
was laid to rest when a bill to amend the constitution succeeded to garner a two-
third majority in the House of Representatives.150  
 
The idea of Majimboism was, however, far from buried and forgotten, and its 
resurrection in the early 1990s resulted in the most violent outbreak between 
government supporters and the opposition, that Kenya had seen since 
independence.151 As pressure was mounting against Moi’s repressive regime, 
KANU’s power found itself threatened by the return of multi-party politics. It 
thus sought ways to control the electorate, which was done by calling on 
Majimboism.152 While KANU officially equated Majimbo with federalism, they 
used it to counter the democratic processes by evoking the fear of Kikuyu 
domination. To this end, multi-party governance was portrayed as an anti-
government movement, as well as a tool of Western domination.153 Majimbo 
rallies were launched throughout Kenya, but mostly within the Rift Valley region, 
and violence between ethnic groups broke out.154 This was spurred by five rallies 
all held over six weeks in late 1991, under the eyes of politicians, such as 
Nicholas Biwott155, who aligned themselves with Moi and aspired to fight off 
multi-partyism. KANU MP Joseph Misoi declared, “unless those clamouring for 
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political pluralism stop, we must devise a protective mechanism by launching the 
movement”.156  
 
These rallies served two main purposes. Firstly, using Majimboism as a defence 
mechanism implied that the Kikuyu would dominate the other smaller tribes. 
The Kalenjin were made to believe that the Kikuyu would persecute them if 
KANU and Moi lost power. Thus, one can talk of the invention of the fear of 
Kikuyu domination.157 Secondly, due to the need to create KANU ‘areas,’ caused 
by a clause in Kenya’s constitution stipulating that candidates needed 25% of the 
votes in at least five of the eight provinces, Majimbo was used to ‘purify’ multi-
ethnic regions.158 KANU targeted ‘outsiders’ and aimed at policing regional 
boundaries to cleanse migrants and swing voters out of their electoral 
strongholds to dissipate dissent, as well as to simply get rid of recalcitrant 
voters.159  
 
The injustices of colonial land distribution, which continued after independence, 
seemed to provide the confirmation of the fear of domination.160 Thus, the 
violence that accompanied the Majimbo rallies was justified by claiming that 
they were expelling people who were illegally occupying land, which 
traditionally did not belong to them. Because of this violence, the Kikuyu started 
feeling persecuted by the other ethnic groups.161 The land issue is therefore also 
essential in understanding why Majimboism was such a compelling idea. 
 
Despite the historic elections of 2002, which ended KANU’s reign, ethnic 
manipulation did not end. Having promised the people a new constitution, NARC 
led by Kibaki, established the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC). 
Its task was to make recommendation on “the structure and system of 
government in the constitutional organization of the republic; and the extent of 
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devolution of power to local authorities”.162 This restructuring and devolution of 
power was meant to transfer authority to sub-national entities, in a bid to strip 
the executive of the unbridled power that it had enjoyed under Kenyatta and 
Moi. Many, especially minority groups, associated devolution with a form of 
federalism, similar to KADU’s proposed Majimbo constitution. 163 
 
Due to the history of Majimboism, the discussion over the new constitution and 
what would constitute devolution quickly became politicised. The first model of 
devolution drafted, if applied would have diminished the capacity of the central 
government to dominate and manipulate local communities. The structures 
proposed would have created a central government concerned with defence, 
foreign affairs, law enforcement, elections and other overreaching national 
matters, but would have left the day-to-day running to District governments.164 
However, this draft was denounced as another Majimboist trap. The government 
was divided between those who did not accept the proposition because they 
were afraid of the hardening of ethnic divisions, and those who were afraid to 
break networks of patronage and the ability of the central government to protect 
the political and economic interests of their groups.165 In the end, the NARC 
failed to establish a new constitution failing to deliver its promise to Kenyans. 
Kibaki was, rightly or not, blamed for this failure and it appeared to Kenyans as if 
once again, the government had demonstrated its inability of putting the need of 
its people before its own self-interest.  
 
Later Odinga used Kibaki’s failure as a political platform for the election of 2007 
under his new party the ODM, once more invoking devolution.166 While Odinga 
never officially endorsed Majimboism, this was how many Kikuyu interpreted 
his campaign. This was partly caused by the presence of members of the ‘former 
regime’ in the ODM, those who had served KANU and had been part of the 
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militant Majimboism of the 1990s.167 These included: William Ruto of the rift 
valley, Franklin Bett, Zako Cheruiyot, William ole Ntimama and Jackson Kibor. 
According to Anderson, the population of the Rift Valley interpreted ODMs 
devolution campaign as the endorsement of the expulsion of the alien and the 
restoration of land to the Maasai and Kalenjin. As a result, a reported 10,000 
Kikuyu voters fled from the region before the elections.168 Kenya’s 2007 
elections, with the popular ’41 against 1 tribe’ slogan, thus revived Majimboism 
and the fear of renewed violence was felt throughout the country.  
 
This section has shown how the failed reform movement of Majimbo was at the 
root of many of Kenya’s later issues. Its failure perpetuated a system of 
governance used by the British, which in the end divided the ethnic groups. It 
also allowed for the manipulation of Majimbo, used by the political elite to revive 
the fears of minority groups, and to ensure the stronghold of the leader in power. 
By creating distrust and fear amongst groups about what would happen if the 
‘other’ took control of the state, Majimbo ensured KANU’s electoral victories of 
1991, 1994, and 1997. Additionally, the failure of the movement also meant that 
the desire to reform the Kenyan state never completely died. This explains how 
Kibaki’s party won in 2002, but also how it ended up facing a crisis of legitimacy 
when it failed to implement the promised reforms. As warned by de Tocqueville, 
there is a danger in failed or aborted attempts at reforms as they are often the 
causes of revolutions.169 
 
2.3 Impunity: Accountability, Trials and Tribulations 
 
For its clientelist and manipulative state to survive, Kenya’s system of 
governance has relied on impunity. Despite numerous documents and 
commissions that have unravelled the truth about corruption scandals, political 
detainees, torture, the contracting of gangs to intimidate voters and the 
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government’s apparent incapability to stop violence, none in the political elite 
have ever been brought to justice. Various attempts at accountability have 
invariably pitted the relatively small group of reformers against politically 
cunning veterans who have every interest in keeping the status quo. The latter 
have used the nation-building project to serve narrow sets of interests, ensuring 
the continuity of impunity thus allowing personal accumulation of wealth and 
control. Comparing these previous attempts of democratic transitions with that 
of the PEV, highlights some dangerous continuations of this trend.  
 
After the PEV, the Transitional Justice process was accompanied by a general 
feeling of enthusiasm by both Kenyans and the international community. The 
KNDR, the Kriegler commission, and CIPEV have all been considered as 
indispensible for the positive progress of the new government.170 Although many 
have expressed regret for the failure to establish the Special Tribunal and have 
raised concerns over the extent of accountability achieved, the involvement of 
the ICC seems to have fulfilled, at least in part, the desire for justice.171 An air of 
hope and of having been granted a ‘new start’ at politics, swelled through the 
Kenyan population and much of the international community. However, it is 
crucial to be reminded that such feelings and attempts at accountability and 
reform are not new in Kenyan history. In fact, previous attempts at reaching a 
form of accountability have mostly failed. The most that any of these 
commissions and reforms has ever achieved has been the production of reports, 
which have unearthed information on the extent of corruption and political 
violence.172 While acquiescing that, that in itself is an achievement, which has 
provided Kenyans with an objective account of the past, these commissions have 
not, however, brought Kenya much closer to an accountable, legitimate and 
wholly democratic government.  
 
In May of 1992, amidst pressure from the population and civil society, 
parliament selected a Committee to investigate the ethnic clashes that had taken 
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place in the past year surrounding the election. The 238-page Kiliku report found 
that “779 persons had been killed, 674 injured, 1236 arrested, 248 charged, 243 
prosecuted and 54 000 displaced.”173 Furthermore, it collected evidence that 
incriminated many members of the government. Amongst the most prominent, 
the list included Vice-President George Saitoti, Minister for Energy Nicholas 
Biwott, Minister of state William Ntimama, Chairman of Nakuru Wilson Leitich, 
and the Speaker of the House Professor Ngeno.174 The report stated that the 
causes for such abuse were politically motivated, and geared at reducing the 
numbers of non-Kalenjin voters in the Rift Valley by evicting or disenfranchising 
them.175 The report however faded away, as President Moi not only rejected its 
recommendations, but also publicly praised Biwott for ensuring that KANU 
dominated in the Rift Valley Province. Moi’s reward was to appoint Biwott to a 
ministerial role. Furthermore, the report failed to deter such actions, as the 
government went ahead to support or incite ethnic violence in the next electoral 
year of 1997.176 
 
Moi set up another judicial commission of enquiry in 1999, following the 1997 
electoral violence. It issued the Akiwumi Report in 2000, which was only 
published on the eve of parliamentary elections in November 2002. The report 
was mandated to look into the causes of the ethnic clashes and recommend 
action to be taken against perpetrators.177 During the hearings, various attempts 
at having the senior members of the government who were implicated in the 
violence appear before the inquiry, were continuously frustrated. The 
government replaced the original Lead Counsel of the Commission with one of 
their own, as the Counsel had allowed incriminating evidence by key witnesses 
to be adduced by the Commission.178 Despite this, the report still provides some 
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information and recounts in detail forced detentions, political murders, and 
instances of torture showing that the violence was an orchestrated political act 
aimed at disrupting and curtailing the democratisation process. It also shows 
that no action was ever taken by the government and its security forces to 
prevent or stop the violence.179 Despite finally agreeing to publicise the report, 
no action was ever taken to apprehend the perpetrators or restore land and 
other lost property.  
 
Further attempts at accountability were undertaken by the NARC under Kibaki. 
Having won the 2002 elections on a bid to reform the government and put an 
end to corruption, Kibaki instigated an ‘anti-corruption drive’. 180  Kibaki 
immediately created the new Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
(MoJCA) mandated to coordinate this anti-corruption drive and to identify and 
create the legislation needed to do so.181 John Githongo, who had so far worked 
at Transparency International, was appointed to the new position of Permanent 
Secretary in the Office of the President for Governance and Ethics. His 
appointment was seen as an indication of how serious the government was 
about eradicating the pervasive corruption of the state.182 Furthermore by May 
2003 the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) was signed creating 
the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC). Another act, the Public Officer 
Ethic Act (POEA) was also put in place, which provided a code of conduct for 
government officials. These new legislative acts and institutions were to enquire 
and set up commissions to look into injustices of the past and instances of 
corruption such as the Goldberg scandal, in order to bring individuals involved in 
corruption to court and undertake asset recovery. This was based on the new 
pillars of leadership, political will in ‘dealing with the past’ and a ‘zero-tolerance 
policy’ toward corruption.183 It is because of these institutional reforms that the 
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IMF resumed lending at the end of 2003. Many had described this time in Kenyan 
politics as the transition they had been waiting for.184  
 
The first of these commissions to be set up was the Ndungu Commission, in June 
of 2003, which was mandated to inquire into the illegal allocation of public lands. 
The commission was to identify officials involved in illegal allocations and make 
recommendations for the restoration of this land to its proper purpose and for 
appropriate criminal prosecutions.185 It produced a 244 page-long report with 
two even longer appendices. The report shows constant abuse of presidential 
discretion in giving land grants to individuals without consideration of public 
interest, under both Kenyatta and Moi.186 One of the report’s recommendations 
was to establish a tribunal that would deal with the issue of land reforms 
exclusively. It would assess individual cases and oversee the revocation and 
rectification of land titles. Unfortunately, government delays in publishing the 
report (six months after being presented to Kibaki) raised suspicions of 
manipulation of the conclusions.187 Many suspect that the report would have 
otherwise incriminated several more MPs and civil servants.188 Furthermore, its 
recommendations remain largely unimplemented and corrupt dealings in public 
land have continued under Kibaki.189  
 
In 2004, the NARC set up a judicial commission to investigate into the 
Goldenberg scandal, whose findings were released in February 2006. There was 
a long commission hearing, which showed gross corruption under Moi’s 
government, and the bypassing of financial controls. Witnesses reported up to 60 
billion shillings (a 5th of Kenya’s GDP) looted from the Central Bank through the 
Exchange Bank belonging to Kamlesh Pattni, the scandals’ mastermind.190 The 
report named government officials, including former Vice-President Saitoti, 
former President Moi and other MPs. Although several of those involved have 
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been prosecuted, excluding the former Vice-President and Moi who were 
granted immunity, none have been convicted.191  
 
NARC’s drive against the Goldenberg scandal ground to a halt as Kibaki’s 
government itself became marred in its own corruption scandal; the Anglo-
Leasing affair. Despite Kibaki’s claim that under his leadership, true reforms 
would take place and impunity would end, the government was scrutinised by 
Kibaki’s very own anti-corruption tsar, John Githongo. The latter revealed 
corruption, which involved money laundering away from a new security and 
passport printing system, in order to finance the NARC’s election bid in 2007.192 
As this information was unearthed, incriminating the highest echelons of the 
government, Githongo went into exile as threats and accusations of disloyalty 
were made against him.193 While one must recognise that corruption and state 
predation under Kibaki lessened, they re-emerged after the 2005 failure of the 
constitutional referendum and the split of the NARC. 194  This severely 
compromised the legitimacy of its institutions. As underlined by The Economist, 
although corruption had lessened under Kibaki, his regime still contained former 
KANU members, who jumped ship as it became clear that Moi would not last 
another election, and had been implicated in many of the aforementioned 
corruption scandals.195 
 
Therefore, while Kibaki at first seemed to have wanted to implement reforms 
along the lines of his election campaign, this became more of a ‘show and tell’ 
rather than an indication of his dedication to reforming the Kenyan system of 
governance. This section has also highlighted the economic nature of the crimes 
committed by members of the governing elite. With proper auditing, it would be 
easy to accuse and imprison individuals for such crime, hence explaining the 
strong grip that the culprits have kept on the system of governance.  
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Furthermore, one can see the value of drawing the links with previously failed 
commissions to those carried out after the PEV. The observations of CIPEV and 
Kriegler Commissions support much of the information discovered in previous 
investigations. All of them show that any members of society who attempted to 
follow the rule of law and bring perpetrators to justice or report infringements 
were systematically punished. Those who turned a blind eye or were involved in 
fraudulent activities were rewarded for their loyalty to their leaders. No 
government, thus far, has shown the ability to let go of the benefits of a tight hold 
on the state-apparatus.196  
2.4 Conclusion 
 
 Kenya’s system of governance is characterised by three main attributes; 
patrimonialism, ethnic based competition for resources and impunity. These 
originated from British indirect rule, which artificially created an African elite to 
control the masses. The colonial state’s authority relied on the loyalty of a 
handful of people, who were rewarded with access to fertile land. The leaders of 
independent Kenya, who relied on patronage, not only to win elections, but also 
to reward loyalty and punish disloyalty, perpetuated this system. In the end, this 
strengthened the executive to the point that Kenya became a one party state 
under KANU. During Moi’s reign, the Kenyan state weakened as patronage 
sources diminished, and Moi responded by becoming increasingly authoritarian. 
In his later years with the democratisation of Kenya, clientelist networks 
increased in numbers as more individuals with political ambitions came to the 
fore, each requiring their own support network. As a result, as Mueller states, 
“Over time the state outside the president developed the seemingly contradictory 
characteristics of being deliberately weak and simultaneously predatory.”197 
 
These clientelist networks and political affiliations are often rooted in ethnic 
groups. This is caused by the competition for resources, whose access is 
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determined by political affiliation. Under Kenyatta, this competition was 
detrimental for minorities, as he had privileged the Kikuyu - both to appease 
their grievances from the colonial times, and to gain their loyalty. However, 
under Moi, the fear of Kikuyu domination was amplified by manipulating 
Majimbo. KANU used the idea that Kenya needed a Majimboist constitution, 
giving provinces more autonomy, by arguing that otherwise the Kikuyu majority 
would always dominate politics. Majimbo was used to justify driving certain 
ethnicities out of provinces in order to rid KANU provinces of recalcitrant voters. 
Reviving fears of Kikuyu domination further exacerbated the perception of the 
need to vote for one’s ethnic group in order to secure access to resources. This 
shows how the failure of the reform movement meant that much as under British 
rule, many felt unrepresented and thus harboured grievances against the state.  
 
Lastly, this chapter has shown how impunity is necessary for this system of 
governance to be sustainable. As we have seen, amassing patronage resources 
often required corruption and dubious land dealings. Would a reformist 
opposition win power, they would not only want economic restoration, but also 
call for the punishment of such unlawful conduct - in part to ensure legitimacy 
and in part because of the desire for political revenge. Thus, any attempts at 
ending impunity have been half-hearted, as a genuine attempt would have been 
damaging, personally and economically to many in Kenya’s governing elite. One 
can thus talk of a system of governance that is heavily guarded by members of 
the political elite.  
 
In light of the historical overview and continuous politicking of the current 
coalition, this thesis, while recognising the new institutions and constitution that 
have been formed post-PEV, questions their effectiveness in changing this 
system without the local impetus to do so. It is further important to question 
whether the ICC, a body whose legitimacy has often been questioned198 could 
realistically help change the state of affairs, with the prosecution of a mere four 
members of the polity. Furthermore, in light of the incentives to keep the status 
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quo, one could question whether the presence of the ICC is benign and simply the 
result of a confused and dazed political class, or rather another tool to be 
manipulated for political gain?  
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Chapter 3 Kenya’s Political Landscape 
 
This chapter analyses the politics leading up to the PEV. I divide this politics 
into the long and the short term: 
 
In the long term, three main features of Kenya’s politics are highlighted. These 
are what help explain the decision-making processes of the governing elite and 
the formation and drivers of political parties. Firstly, Kenya’s political landscape 
is characterised by a fragmented opposition and fluid political parties. Secondly, 
political parties seek votes in their ethnic constituencies due to the client-patron 
social structure that frames the relationship between the governing elite and its 
population. Finally, it is in the political elites’ and the clients’ interest to maintain 
the status quo, their position as the governing elite, and the continuation of 
‘politics-as-usual’. 
 
In light of these three features, it will be shown that the events of the PEV, 
international mediation, and subsequent choice to begin an accountability 
process, were motivated by political calculations and strategies rather than by 
the simple desire to see peace and justice be done, as is often assumed of 
Transitional Justice processes. 
 
In the short term, the intention of this chapter is to show the tense and sensitive 
situation Kenya found itself after the 2007 elections. This will be done by taking 
a closer look at the timeline of events that led up to the involvement of the ICC.  
 
3.1 In the Long Term 
3.1.1 A Fragmented Political Environment 
 
In 2005, the NARC split; the official reason for this was Kibaki’s reneging 
of the previously agreed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).199 The MOU 
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would have resulted in constitutional amendments and the creation of the post 
of Prime Minister to be allocated to Odinga.200 This combined with the failure to 
establish a new constitution, led to the complete rejection of the MOU and the 
collapse of the NARC.201 As a result, Odinga formed the ODM to challenge Kibaki 
in the next elections. A few months later, the ODM itself split, with Musyoka 
Kilonzo202 creating the ODM-K, which then did a U-turn in support of Kibaki’s 
new party, the PNU.203 Thus by the time of the 2007 election, Kenya had a very 
fragmented political elite.  
 
This political situation, if framed in the context of Kenya’s electoral politics of the 
last ten years, is not so surprising. The previous election in 2002 had been a 
historic moment, as it had marked the end of the one-party state. The coalition 
had defeated KANU, which had been in power since 1963.204 However, in 1992, 
Moi had been obliged to liberalise due to internal and external pressures, and 
held Kenya’s first multi-party elections in 26 years. Despite the opening of 
competitive politics, KANU survived the first two democratic elections against its 
three main opposition parties.205 While both elections were subject to some 
controversy due to state repression and irregularities, election observers said 
that the results reflected Kenyans’ wishes.206  
 
By the 2002 elections however, the opposition had learnt its lesson, and readying 
itself to counter-balance the dominant party, formed the NARC coalition. In these 
elections, Moi nominated Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor, which prompted 
Kibaki to defect from KANU. He formed his own party, the National Alliance of 
Kenya (NAK), a conglomeration of 12 other smaller parties. Kibaki also sought 
out a number of other defectors who had formed the LDP (headed by Odinga).207 
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Wangari Maathai wrote; “the fact that the many of the country’s different micro-
nations had come together to bring an end to a discredited regime by democratic 
means […] led me and others to believe that 2002 might finally be when Kenya 
turned a page on the negative, competitive politics between the micro-nations 
[…].”208 However, while the NARC coalition was successful in overthrowing 
KANU, it was itself a fragmented party whose main goal had been to win an 
election.  
 
Many would argue that fluid and fragmented parties, which tend to form 
coalitions, are neither unique nor surprising for such a new democracy.209 
Politicians frequently switch parties or create new ones, often resulting in short-
lived organisations, fluid personnel and unclear policy agendas.210 As a result, 
the image of the party may not always reflect its members, or clearly show who 
is a member of a governing coalition and who belongs to the opposition. Party 
switching means that politicians have fewer incentives to implement policies and 
act on behalf of the electorate.211  
 
Furthermore, as Sartori states, coalitions such as the NARC are the means to 
challenge a hegemonic party system and transition toward institutionalising 
democracy. Whether they then hold or break depends on socio-economic 
conditions.212 African political parties, especially when looking at those that 
participated in the Third Wave of democratisation, have often been considered 
weak.213 This weakness is defined by the lack of their reach beyond the capital, 
and their lack of organisation, combined with poor socio-economic conditions 
such as the general lack of a politically independent middle class in African 
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economies, the strength and resources available to civil society, and the salience 
of ethnicity in politics.214  
 
Olson, in his comparison of new democratic governments after the fall of 
communism in central Europe, further characterises the nature of new 
democratic parties emerging after dominant one-party regimes. According to the 
author, unstable party formations are common as parties search for ways to 
organise themselves internally and present themselves externally.215 Efforts to 
combine into larger coalitions are a result of elite and leadership strategy and 
experiment, and reflect an overall concern for votes rather than members. Once 
the overarching goal of removing the dominant party is achieved, the basis for 
internal unity is destroyed.216 This reflects the lack of a common agenda and 
specific policies for governance. Instead, such coalitions depend on vague 
slogans and catchall phrases to appeal to feelings of national well-being.217 In 
Kenya, this had been the promise of ‘reforms’ and ending ‘corruption and 
impunity’. The priority however, had been the defeat of KANU, thereby gaining 
access to the state and its resources. This explains the disintegration of the 
coalition in 2005, which contributed to the last-minute creation of new 
opposition parties that were to compete in 2007.  
 
3.1.2 Political Parties and Their Ethnic Constituencies 
 
Kenyan political parties have ethnic support bases. By the 2007 elections, 
this situation had split the country between Kibaki’s Kikuyu ethnic group and 
Odinga’s Luo and Kalenjin ethnic groups.218 The apparent ethnic character of 
much of African politics has long been the subject of academic scrutiny. Authors 
argue that its sources can be found in the patron-client interactions that 
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structured power relations in pre-colonial times.219 These forms of interaction in 
the past existed for the dual purpose of providing protection for the people, and 
ensuring loyalty to and the stature of the leader. At the time however, ethnic and 
tribal identities were fluid, contested, and in constant creation and re-
creation.220 It was only because of colonially imposed structures of social 
relations that static ethnic groups were created. Under colonial rule, for the 
African elite, access to the state and patronage was the key to the accumulation 
of wealth, and ethnicity was a means to access these resources.221 Thus 
according to Mamdani, political identities were created to facilitate colonialism 
creating the ‘moral ethnicity’ present in many African states today.222  
 
At independence, competitive elections and the ‘Africanisation’ of the state began 
to make ethnicity increasingly important as the foundation for political support 
and access to the higher levels of the state apparatus.223 At the grassroots, ethnic 
identity and membership were reinforced as the basis for access to the state and 
its resources. Thus, the mobilisation of ethnic communities was not only sought 
after by the governing elite, but also by the grassroots.224 Lake and Rothchild 
define this situation in the modern state as the ‘ethnic contract’, which is the 
formal or informal understanding that channel politics in peaceful times.225 A 
number of safeguards are put in place to protect this contract, which may take 
the form of ethnic balance in the government, military and electoral rules. 226 
 
The danger in parties with ethnic support bases is that groups may become 
locked into competitions for resources and state power. With the winner-take-all 
outcome of majoritarian elections, such as was the case in Kenya, and the 
knowledge that a change of balance of power may occur, fear of domination and 
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exclusion from access to the state increases.227 In such situations, ethnicity 
provides a key marker for politicians seeking to build constituencies in order to 
attain or maintain political power. This results in ‘ethnic outbidding’, driving 
even the more moderate politicians to draw electoral support from their ethnic 
community.228 This situation can be observed in the year preceding the 2007 
elections, as both the ODM and PNU slogans and public speeches were geared 
toward amassing votes from their respective ethnic constituencies.  
 
3.1.3 Maintaining the Status Quo 
 
Kenya’s governing elite seeks to maintain the status quo.229 This is the 
maintenance of their position as the governing elite and the continuation of 
‘politics-as-usual’: one without accountability that may threaten their position 
and result in their imprisonment. Klopp explains corruption as a response to the 
need to win elections and to remain in power.230 While Kenya may have moved 
away from one-party domination, this did not destroy the social structures of the 
client-patron relationships. Both Klopp and Kasfir argue that the logic of the 
clientelist system can be organised to work with more than one hierarchy of 
patronage distribution.231 A system of decentralised patrimonialism evolves with 
democratisation that sustains these numerous fragmented political parties. This 
is what Kasfir named ‘decentralised clientelism’.232  
 
This theory fits Robert Bates’s framework, suggesting that with liberalisation 
and falling revenues come increased political uncertainty, state predation and 
economic decline.233 In Kenya, as Bates suggests, this also meant that political 
violence increased with state informalisation, especially during the post KANU 
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era.234 Parties surrounded themselves by militia gangs 235 for ‘protection’. As 
argued by Cheeseman and Branch, with political fragmentation, the 
militarisation of society becomes more likely. Using militias permits political 
leaders to carry out tasks they would never have been able to with the police or 
army during the one-party era.236 However, this is dangerous in the long-term as 
it decentralises the control of the use of force and reduces the ability of the state 
to control conflict, as seen during the PEV. Importantly, it also raises the stakes 
of reform and accountability, which further explains the refusal of the elite to 
disband some of these groups. 237 
 
Furthermore, because clientelism is understood to mean discrimination in the 
distribution of resources and in the appointment of officials by regions that are 
defined ethnically238, it provides the incentive to cling to power and support ‘a 
protective clique in power at all costs’.239 Accordingly, impunity is needed by 
patrons who give benefits, as well as by the clients who receive them. Without it, 
the partnership will dissolve as the patron loses his power to protect and 
consequently loses the loyalty of the client.240 In addition, politicians who have 
attained their place in the patronage chain using violence will also need 
protection from the law.241 Thus, any change in the political management and 
structures of Kenya’s polity endangers the credibility of the party and the well 
being of individual politicians. 
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3.2 In the Short Term 
 
The PEV resulted in more than 
1,200 deaths and the displacement of 
over 500,000 people. The violence that 
ensued took on an ethnic dimension 
due to Kenya’s political landscape, 
pitting the Kikuyu ethnic group 
supporting the PNU against the Luo 
and Kalenjin ethnic groups supporting 
ODM. First, the violence started out as 
spontaneous uprisings in the multi-
ethnic regions of the country, in both 
rural and urban areas. The affected 
areas included; Nairobi, Mombasa, 
Kisumu, Nakuru, Naivasha, Eldoret 
and the rural areas of the rift valley 
and Nyanza. 242  This was soon 
followed by a campaign of organised 
violence orchestrated by the ODM 
political elite against PNU supporters 
in the Rift Valley region. In retaliation, 
criminal gangs such as the Mungiki and Taliban carried out their own campaigns 
of violence against ODM supporters, allegedly at the behest of the PNU. This was 
accompanied by state violence from the police force and security agencies.243 
 
After weeks of fighting, on the 28th of February 2008, amid pressure from the 
international community, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act were 
signed. The Act, establishing a power sharing arrangement was set up to serve 
Kenya for five years until the next elections, with the task of undertaking a 
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number of institutional reforms to ensure a peaceful and just transition. The 
signing of the Act was aided by mediation by the international community, which 
had congregated in Kenya in an attempt to intervene as soon as the violence had 
erupted.  
 
On the 8th of January 2008, John Kufuor, then the Chair of the African Union (AU), 
visited Kenya in order to meet with Kibaki and Odinga. While the AU Chairman 
did not manage to bring the two to meet face-to-face, a series of meetings did 
result in the acceptance and creation of a mediation team; a panel composed of 
eminent personalities from Africa. Former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, 
former Tanzanian President, Benjamin Mkapa and former South African First 
Lady, Graça Machel mediated the KNDR.244 The Tanzanian President, Jakaya 
Kikwete, joined the panel in the last stages of the mediation. In order to structure 
the mediation the panel drew up a four-point agenda, with both short and long 
term provisions for a peaceful future. These were:  
 
1) Immediate action to stop the violence and restore fundamental rights 
and liberties;  
2) Immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis, promote 
reconciliation, healing and restoration of calm; 
3) Overcome the political crisis (by creating a coalition government); 
4) Long-term issues and solutions (including constitutional and 
institutional reforms, consolidating national cohesion and unity, 
poverty and unemployment). 245 
 
In addition, the parties to the KNDR agreed to establish a number of institutional 
frameworks to support the implementation of the Agenda and achieve a peaceful 
and just transition. 
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 The GNU agreed to:  
1) Establish an Independent Review Commission on the General elections 
held in Kenya on 27th December 2007 (Kriegler commission). The KC was 
mandated to identify weaknesses and inconsistencies in the electoral 
laws, examine the structure and management of the Electoral Commission 
of Kenya (ECK) and to investigate electoral participation. The Commission 
submitted its report to the President on 17th September 2008 246 
2) Establish a Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence 
(CIPEV). CIPEV was mandated to investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the election violence, including the actions or omissions of 
State security agents and to make recommendations on criminal 
accountability and reconciliation.247 On October 15th 2008, it released its 
findings in a 529-page report, commonly known as the Waki Report. 248 
3) Establish a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The 
TJRC was mandated to investigate, analyse, and report upon abuses of 
economic and human rights between 12 December 1963 and 28 February 
2008.  
4) Pursue a constitutional review process249 to lead to the writing of a new 
constitution.  
 
CIPEV was composed of Kenyan Chair Philip Waki and two international experts, 
Gavin Alistair McFadyen and Pascal K. Kambale.250 The report records 3,561 
injuries, 117,216 instances of property destruction, and 1,133 deaths.251 It not 
only shows the failures of the state security agencies to contain the violence, but 
also that they were the culprits for many of the deaths and injuries.252 The report 
also discovered that 1600 Administrative Police had been organised by state 
officials to carry out a clandestine operation to disrupt polling in Nyanza 
Province. The PNU used their positions in the National Security Advisory 
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Committee to order the Kenyan Police Force to use force against ODM 
strongholds. It was also alleged that Uhuru Kenyatta253 financed and facilitated a 
meeting between the Mungiki criminal gang and the Head of Public Services 
Francis Muthaura to organise retaliatory violence in Nakuru and Naivasha.254 In 
addition, the ODM counterpart was found to have prepared a plan to attack and 
punish PNU supporters in the Rift Valley. William Ruto255 (ODM) and Henry 
Kosgey256 (ODM) also allegedly established a network with the objective of 
killing and oppressing PNU supporters in Eldoret, Rift Valley.257 
 
With these findings in mind and to address the large-scale abuse, amongst its 
recommendations the Waki Report called for a number of actions to be 
undertaken to end impunity by bringing the culprits to accountability. It 
established that the Kenyan government should set up a Special Tribunal (ST) 
composed of both local and international experts to try those who bore greatest 
responsibility. In order to ensure compliance the report was accompanied by a 
sunset clause stating that a list of names given to Annan by CIPEV for 
confidential keeping would be sent to the Prosecutor of the ICC if Kenya failed to 
comply by September 2009.258  
 
During the following year, Kenya politicised the justice process259 and failed to 
establish the ST. As Musila shows, the year of 2009 was marred by intense 
political debate between those who endeavoured to set up a Tribunal in an 
attempt to avoid the case going to The Hague, while others argued that only an 
international court could bring justice, due to the corruption of Kenyan’s justice 
system.260 Many have argued that the efforts to establish the ST were frustrated 
by partisan politics, individual interests as well as ethnic interests of certain 
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leaders.261 Members of the political elite vacillated between the different options, 
uncertain which one would provide the best protection for their own agendas.262 
Some have argued that this politicking is not only indicative of a lack of 
willingness to bring the culprits to accountability and end the systemic impunity 
present in Kenya’s system of governance, but also of politicians attempts at 
‘fixing’ opponents. Many in Kenya argued that this marked the continuation of 
‘business as usual’.263 
 
After giving the country numerous opportunities to resuscitate its own 
proceedings, and a year of back and forth negotiations, including numerous 
meetings with Annan, the former UN Secretary General handed over the list of 
names to the ICC Prosecutor.264 Subsequently, the ICC announced it would 
proceed with preliminary investigations, while Ocampo used the power of 
proprio motu265 for the first time in the ICC’s history. After some attempts at 
fighting this decision, the Kenyan government eventually stated that it 
acknowledged that the ICC investigations were caused because of a lack of 
appropriate local judicial mechanism, but affirmed its belief in justice and 
reconciliation. 266 
 
As a result, in December 2011, the ICC summoned six Kenyans allegedly 
responsible for planning and facilitating the post election violence. The 
prosecutor opened two court cases for investigation. The first case, summoned 
Uhuru Kenyatta; former chief of police, Mohammed Hussein Ali; and the head of 
the public service, Francis Muthaura, for ‘committing or contributing’ to the 
killings of supporters of the opposition (ODM), their deportation or forcible 
transfer, rape and other sexual assaults, the persecution of civilians based on 
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their political affiliation, and other inhumane acts. 267  The second case, 
summoned former Higher Education Minister, William Ruto; former Minister for 
Industrialisation, Henry Kosgey and radio executive, Joshua Arap Sang, for 
forming a network to attack PNU supporters in the Rift Valley area.268  
 
On the 23rd of January 2012, the ICC Pre-trial Chamber delivered its judgement 
on the confirmation of charges for the Prosecutor vs. Mr Kenyatta, Mr Muthaura 
and Mr Sang as well as for the Prosecutor vs. Mr Ruto, Mr Sang and Mr Ali. The 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the charges against Mr Ruto as an indirect 
co- perpetrator, pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute.269 In addition it 
also confirmed the charges against Mr Sang, who was accused of contributing to 
the commission of the aforementioned crimes against humanity, pursuant to 
article 25(3)(d)(I) of the Rome Statute. However, in relation to Mr Kosgey, it was 
found that the evidence presented did not meet the evidentiary threshold 
required. 270 
 
Concerning Case II, Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed the charges against Mr 
Muthaura and Mr Kenyatta. The Chamber was satisfied by the evidence 
presented, accusing the two of being indirect co-perpetrators, pursuant to article 
25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, and of having gained control over the Mungiki 
criminal gang and subsequently directing them to commit the crimes.271 
However, in relation to Mr Ali, the Chamber declined to confirm charges as it 
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found that the evidence presented did not provide substantial grounds to believe 
that the Kenya Police participated in the attack in or around Nakuru and 
Naivasha272 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
One can conclude that Kenya’s political landscape before the 2007 
election violence was fragile: 
 
First, the politics of Kenya after the fall of the one-party state were characterised 
by party fragmentation. This can be attributed, in part, to the instability that 
multi-party politics may bring to new democracies, as parties attempt to form 
and organise themselves in order to maximise their chances of winning. Due to 
this fluidity, politicians have little incentive to implement policies or remain 
accountable to their party’s electorate. The formation of parties and coalitions 
are thus driven by political stratagems, and as in Kenya’s case, often have as 
main aim the removal of the incumbent party. 
 
Secondly, ethnic constituencies vote for the party that can deliver protection and 
access to resources. This is what sustains political parties. The incentive in Kenya 
is that winning not only guarantees political power, but also economic 
gratification for the client, and loyalty for the patron. Old networks of client-
patron relationships essentially both lock politicians to their ethnic groups and 
allow them to be voted in power. This creates competition amongst the ethnic 
groups, and fear of the ‘other’s’ domination, which invites politicians to use 
ethnic outbidding.  
 
Lastly, since any change in this system and in balance of power may cause harm 
to the party and certain individuals, the costs of losing elections are high. This is 
especially true if the new incoming party demands accountability for past 
misconduct. This has created a situation whereby members of the ‘former 
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regime’ have to protect their interests; this can only be done through the 
maintenance of impunity and the status quo. 
 
In the short run, in light of the involvement of the political elite in the PEV and 
the country’s’ system of governance the eventual transition and coalition 
government that Kenya created after the PEV has two striking features. The first 
is the acceptance of the involvement of the international community in Kenya’s 
internal affairs, and the international community’s willingness to become 
involved. The second striking feature is Kenya’s acceptance of undertaking a 
process for accountability.  
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Chapter 4 The Internationalisation of the Transitional Process 
 
This chapter is concerned with the international aspect of Kenya’s PEV, 
mediation and agreement that followed it. As we have seen, Kenya’s acceptance 
of the international community in its internal affairs, and the international 
community’s willingness to do so is puzzling. This is both in light of Kenya’s 
politics as analysed in the previous chapters, as well as the fact that the costs of 
allowing an international body to interfere in domestic affairs, such as the loss of 
absolute sovereignty, of decision-making autonomy and of domestic legitimacy 
and credibility are usually avoided by states. 273  Cries of neo-colonialism, 
Western domination and the right to self-determination are the usual crux of 
African states arguments against the involvement of the international 
community.274  
 
This chapter will first explain the motivations of Kenya in allowing mediation by 
a third party to take place. It will be seen how both parties had reached a 
stalemate, where neither could foresee an acceptable outcome with the 
continuing violence, yet neither was ready to lose. 275 On the one hand, mediation 
can be explained by the need for Odinga to turn the balance of power against the 
incumbent. On the other, Kibaki’s reluctant acceptance of this situation was due 
to the socio-economic impact a prolonged conflict would have had and the risk of 
antagonising foreign investors and donors.  
 
Secondly, it will be shown that the willingness of the international community to 
involve itself in the internal affairs of a sovereign state should be understood in 
the geo-political context and strategic placement of Kenya in the Horn of Africa 
and East Africa. As such, the interest of the Western world in the PEV will be 
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clarified by the presence of International Organisations and the NGO-isation276 of 
Kenya. Although neither the UN, nor any North American or European state 
leaders had been directly involved in the mediation processes, the pressure they 
exerted has been described as indispensible to ending the PEV. 277 
 
Lastly, we will show that the involvement of the AU was motivated by both the 
interests of the organisation itself and of its member states, showing a rare 
display of unity. Showing the interests of the AU and of its member states will 
once more illustrate that the willingness to mediate in the Kenyan PEV had as 
much to do with political calculations than with democratic values and norms.  
 
4.1 Negotiators: The First Internationals 
 
Despite Kibaki’s insistence that the crisis needed to be sorted out domestically, 
the PEV resulted in the flocking-in of the international community to attempt to 
mediate the PEV. The first attempts at mediation by an international third party 
started on 2nd January 2009, as South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
intervened to try to stop the crisis. However, Tutu failed to bring the two parties 
together.278 This intervention was soon followed by a second attempt on 8th 
January, this time with the AU Chairman Kufuor and WB Country Director, acting 
as facilitator. As progress was slow, another intervention was attempted by 
South African Cyril Ramaphosa,279 but was soon dismissed by Kibaki’s faction. 
However, eventually after much stalling from Kibaki’s side, the parties agreed 
that there should be an end to the violence, and that there should be a dialogue 
to be conducted through a Panel of Eminent African Personalities. To this end, 
Kufuor selected Kofi Annan to head the Panel, a renowned figure with worldwide 
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moral authority and political reputation. Meanwhile the EU, the US, the UN and 
other international agencies, heavily supported these attempts.280 
 
As the election crisis developed, Kibaki, having declared himself President, was 
intent on controlling the state by force, flooding the streets with security forces 
and putting a ban on media broadcasts. According to him, the only way the 
electoral dispute could be resolved was through local courts.281 On the other 
hand, Odinga was adamant that the Presidency had been stolen from him. He 
stated that he was willing to negotiate but not without international guarantees, 
as local courts would be unable to deliver a just outcome.282 He called for 
negotiations to create a transitional coalition government, implement reforms 
and have a re-count of the votes for a re-election. Odinga’s strategy was to call 
for mass action in order to pressure Kibaki and draw the attention of the 
international community.283  
 
For Odinga it would have been clear that the imbalance of power between him 
and Kibaki, an entrenched Head of State with control of the state machinery 
would have made any negotiations asymmetric. Kibaki’s government had 
appointed most senior officials in the judiciary, police, administration, and army. 
This amount of executive power stems from the history of one-party dominance, 
which, conflating state and party, had politicised the state, affecting both the 
legislature and judiciary. Thus, state institutions were weighted toward the 
PNU.284 Furthermore, the constitution, having been amended numerous times by 
previous leaders, could not provide a credible judicial process for resolving the 
electoral dispute. Thus, had Odinga accepted to take the local route, Kibaki as the 
declared winner, would have enjoyed all the benefits of office and have had no 
incentives to make concessions. Furthermore Kibaki’s protective clique285, the 
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group that controlled decision-making and benefited from state patronage, 
seemed determined to stay in office for another 5 years.286 The ODM would thus 
have concluded that in order to succeed and remove Kibaki, it had no option but 
to internationalise the crisis in order to alter this asymmetry; therefore 
explaining Odinga’s insistence on continuing to call for mass action unless 
negotiations were to be internationally mediated.  
 
On the other hand, the economic sanctions and freezing of assets by 
international bodies such as the IMF and WB287, as well as the escalation of 
violence would have forced Kibaki’s hand in accepting international intervention. 
Kenya’s international image as the only stable country and hegemon in the 
region was at stake, and damaging that reputation was dangerous for both the 
economy and politics of the country.288 Additionally, with Odinga continuously 
raising the stakes by calling for mass action, the PNU may have perceived an 
impending catastrophic escalation of violence. With mounting pressure from the 
international community playing on the perception of the need for an immediate 
solution, Kibaki would have realised that the costs of continuing the struggle 
exceeded the benefits to be gained.289  
 
4.2 Negotiators: NGOs 
4.2.1 The NGO-isation of Kenya 
 
The vested interests of the international community in Kenya cannot be 
underestimated. Many foreign investors, from multinational cooperation to the 
UN and WB have their regional headquarters based in Nairobi, together with a 
plethora of INGOs and NGOs that have created their niche in Nairobi. In fact, 
Nairobi is the UN’s third largest headquarters with more than 1000 international 
                                                                                                                                                              
Kimunya, Minister for roads John Michuki, former minister of state defence Njenga Karume and 
Presidential adviser Nathaniel Kang’ethe.  
286
 ICG. “Kenya : Impact of the ICC Proceedings”. 
287
 Ibid. 
288
 Zartman and Touval, “International Mediation.” 
289
 Ibid. 
Kenya and the ICC 
 62 
staff and 3000 national staff.290 Kenya has also long been an ally of the US, and 
after 2001 became the US’s partner in anti-terrorism in the region. Furthermore, 
Kenya is the platform for relief operations to Somalia and Sudan, a haven for 
refugees, and a logistic hub for humanitarian interventions. Thus, Kenya’s geo-
political and strategic position, political stability despite its authoritarianism and 
bouts of violence, and economic stability especially compared to the rest of the 
region have essentially made the country the international communities’ home 
base. Any paralysis or crippling of the country’s infrastructure would deprive 
bordering countries of access to basic commodities, reduce trade, and damage 
foreign investment and disrupt donor programmes.291 The stability of Kenya is 
therefore paramount for the interests of all international actors involved.292 
 
While external donors and institutions are largely regarded as being 
autonomous and politically independent agents, this section seeks to show that 
their relationship with the state and other local NGOs is more blurred than is 
commonly acknowledged.293 This makes these members of the international 
community, with their vested interests, political actors within Kenya. Because of 
the ability of donors and International Organisations (IO) in setting the global 
agenda and influencing international relations, they form an important lobby 
group, one that had many interests in keeping Kenya peaceful and stable.294  
 
4.2.2 The Growth of NGOs 
 
NGOs proliferated most rapidly in the 1990s, as donors turned their 
attention away from the state. This was born out of the assumption that NGOs 
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were more efficient conduits for development than the state.295 This trend was 
associated with the global political transformation of the time, led by the 
Thatcher-Reagan driven emphasis on free markets, which saw the state as 
having a minimal role in development.296 This was enshrined in the New Policy 
Agenda of the 1990s, which had two main goals; economic development despite 
the state, and the sine qua non ‘good governance’ that would allow this to 
happen. 297  NGOs were regarded as being transparent, autonomous, and 
participatory, as being intrinsically democratic and overall legitimate bodies. 
Governments were seen as diametrically opposed to NGOs, being partisan, 
interested in power and nefarious for development. 298  The international 
community thus decreased funding to states in the developing world, and 
increased resources available to NGOs. Donors were seen as market based actors 
with no vested interests, and NGOs were equated with civil society and seen as 
‘the magic bullet’ for Africa.299 At the same time, this relationship was premised 
on the respect for the sovereignty of the state. Whether this turned out to be 
empirically valid is beside the point of this thesis, however it serves to highlight 
both the economic and political interests and agenda of these external donors - 
those not supposed to have any ‘vested interests’ involved. Hearn goes as far as 
to insist that NGOs are key pieces in the Western foreign policy jigsaw, being the 
‘appendages of Northern agencies’ and ‘implementing agents’ of the New Policy 
Agenda. 300 
 
Because of this ideological shift, both Western-based INGOs and local African 
NGOs soon caught up with the changed global order. In 1988, about 8,000 to 
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9,000 NGOs were recorded in the whole of Africa.301 Today there is an estimate 
of over 350,000 organisations in the NGO sector, in Kenya alone.302  The growth 
of NGOs however, was not matched throughout the continent, with less stable 
countries such as Mozambique with 150 registered NGOs, and Sierra Leone’s 285 
registered NGOs.303 In Kenya, in the decade following independence, the sector 
grew four-fold; 44% of new NGOs were foreign. During the period of 1988-1996 
local NGOs grew by 131%, tripling the number of foreign NGOs. Then between 
1996-2003, the NGO sector grew from 511 local and international registered 
NGOs to 2,511. By 2005, it was estimated that there were between 3000 and 
3,500 NGOs operating in Kenya, with over 300,000 membership groups and 
grass-root organisations. Despite a recent shift away from NGOs with aid being 
channelled back to governments in the wake of anti-terrorist foreign policy, 
today $125-230 million are channelled to the country through its NGOs annually, 
which is estimated at 12-25% of the total external resources allocated to 
Kenya.304 In 2007 the WB alone had agreed to assist Kenya with an estimated 
$800 million package for projects through June 2008. 305 
 
As stated by Igoe, Jim and Kelsall, the relationship between the state, foreign aid 
and NGOs is a murky one.306 Officially, donors have very little influence, apart 
from providing funding and promoting good governance. The idea that donors 
are external revolves around the assertion that they do not interfere in domestic 
affairs. However, as the authors state “The reality of the matter is starkly different, 
however, since donors interfere in the internal affairs of African countries all the 
time.” 307  This coupled with the imbalance of power between the donor and the 
recipient, creates dependency on the donors. According to Pronk, giving aid 
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creates an interest for donors to produce results that are in accordance with 
their beliefs and criteria for success.308 
4.2.3 The NGO sector in the Kenyan Mediation 
 
The size of the NGO sector and its respective donors has made it a 
formidable force in the international sphere, often setting the global agenda and 
influencing policymaking. This is also true for Kenya. Brown adds that election 
violence and extrajudicial killings were not a new phenomenon in Kenya, but 
that it had never drawn the attention of the international community, despite the 
authoritarianism and abuse of human rights of the Moi regime.309 He argues that 
the attraction this time was because the PEV mostly affected the Nairobi area, 
where the national and international media and donors were stationed, and that 
the PEV threatened the long-term stability of the country.310 This would have 
been detrimental to all their efforts within Kenya but also to Kenya’s status as 
the gateway to the rest of the region. 
 
The weight that big NGOs carry often means that they feel like entitled legitimate 
actors that are part of the Kenyan political scene.311 However, it is important to 
note that many such NGOs are not always created or inspired by ‘voluntarism’ or 
philanthropic ideals. Instead, many are created as ways to make money, and are 
run like small businesses. Fowler compiled a list of ‘pretender NGOs’. To name a 
couple that are prevalent in Africa: a BRINGO (briefcase NGO) is an NGO that is 
no more than a briefcase with a well-written proposal and does nothing. 
GRINGOs (Government run and initiated-NGOs) are bodies created by 
government with the aim of countering the actions of real NGOs.312  It is 
somewhat ironic that such NGOs are considered part of the Kenyan civil society, 
demanding accountability of the Kenyan government.  
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 For example, in his study of the workings of peace NGOs in Kenya, Eaton notes 
many occasions where these organisations were corrupt, had members with 
strong political ambitions, needed to please disconnected donors, or existed for 
the sole purpose of making money.313 The author shows, that at times, certain 
politicians who often head peace talks use the money they receive to fund their 
own electoral campaigns.314 Eaton concludes that in many of the poorer regions 
of East Africa, peace work is a lucrative business, and one of the largest sources 
of patronage. Eaton further argues that while peace work has become 
increasingly lucrative, donor monitoring has decreased, leading to widespread 
corruption and mismanagement.315 Such NGOs are however able to continue to 
function due to the perception that these bodies are legitimate. The irony is that 
in Kenya, it is these same non-elected and often illegitimate organisations that 
call for TJ, transparency and accountability.  
 
Concerning the PEV, at first not knowing which side would win, donors remained 
neutral, not declaring whether they believed or not that the PNU and ECK had 
tampered with the elections.316 Two notable exceptions were the US and the WB. 
The former initially congratulated Kibaki for his re-election, but two days later 
retracted the statement saying it was a mistake. The latter showed its inclination 
toward Kibaki’s regime when its representative Colin Bruce wrote in a leaked 
memo that the UN endorsed the re-elections, and that he believed the ECKs 
results.317 A statement by the UN denied ever taking such a position. As analyst 
Chris Blattman states, this was probably not so much an indication of a particular 
partisan position by the WB, but rather illustrated the interest of the WB in 
having the crisis resolved, and believing the incumbent would manage to stay in 
power.318 However, as the opposition ODM continued to make the country 
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ungovernable, donors had to find a way to stabilise the state, and found the 
solution to lie in a power-sharing arrangement. This also demonstrates how 
donors’ motivations lie in economic stability and immediate security, rather than 
in democratic processes and outcomes.  
 
In early 2008, donors pressured the incumbent to recognise that the elections 
had been tampered with. This marked one of the first times that donors 
exercised so much pressure after contested elections.319 The parties to the 
conflict dragged their feet in coming to an agreement, “expecting the donors to 
cave-in as they had done in Kenya and elsewhere in the past”.320 It is believed that 
the power-sharing arrangement would not have been possible without the 
coordinated and sustained pressure from the international community. 
 
Therefore, donors and their recipients have vested interests in Kenya, either due 
to the necessity of perpetuating their own existence, or the need to appear 
successful in order to continue with their jobs and ensure the continuation of 
their day-to-day activities. The international community had as first priority the 
quick stabilisation of Kenya. The process used to reach that goal would thus be 
chosen by its ability to do the job quickly and successfully, rather than based on 
democratic values and norms or humanitarian and philanthropic principles. This 
need for quick action explains the immediate attention the international 
community paid to the PEV as opposed to the usual laxer and less timely 
reactions. We have further seen that it is important not to romanticise the role of 
donors in the Kenyan mediation, who do not always call for justice and peace for 
the right reasons. Nonetheless, these are actors, who by virtue of being called 
‘NGO’, have become enmeshed as legitimate actors within Kenyan politics. 
 
4.3 Negotiators: The African Union 
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Despite being notoriously inactive and incapable of resolving the 
continent’s problems, the AU took the initiative and the lead in mediating the 
PEV. It must be noted that the decision to intervene, for an organisation like the 
AU is affected by and dependent on the interests of all of its member states, 
which in the AU’s case, includes 54 states. In addition, this section will show how 
the AU is not only interested in peace making, but also in the promotion and 
existence of the AU itself. Many argue that the AU has been used by member 
states to assert their aspirations for leadership, protect their interests in regional 
conflict and to reinvigorate the relevance of the AU on the continent. 321 
 
The AU, which was created in 2002, has as one of its purposes the promotion of 
cooperation and solidarity among its member states in order to address the 
problems facing the continent.322 As such, one of its primary goals is the 
institutionalisation and operationalisation of its peace and security structures. In 
this regard, the Constitutive Act entrenched the right to intervene. It created the 
Peace and Security Council complemented by a Panel of the Wise,323 and the 
intention to create the African Standard Force.324 While the AU is now legally 
able to intervene in the internal affairs of its member states in the name of peace 
and security, one of its most widely recognised challenges is the implementation 
and operationalisation of these norms and institutions.325 
 
With its recent failures, such as the on-going Somalia and South Sudan crises, the 
AU has yet to establish itself as the peacemaker of the continent. African unity 
between states barely exists, and the political will to address internal issues of 
authoritarianism, misappropriation of state-resources and internal conflict is 
mostly inexistent at the organisational level.326 The majority of African leaders 
have held onto the norm of non-intervention in order to continue with ‘business 
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as usual’.327 In light of these glaring difficulties the AU still needs to build its own 
image and reputation on the continent as well as internationally if it wants to 
keep the Western world away and live up to the ideals of Pan-Africanism. 328 The 
Kenyan PEV presented an opportunity for the AU to do just that.  
 
No African states, much like the rest of the international community, could deny 
the importance of a stable Kenya.329 The economy of the East African Community 
(EAC)330 depends on Kenya. Moreover, the political security of the entire Horn331 
and the viability of the regional organisation Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD)332 largely depend on Kenya as a state, which has played a 
major role in stabilising the conflict ridden region.333 As stated by the then chair 
of the AU Commission, Alfa Konare “Kenya is a country that was a hope for the 
continent […] if Kenya burns there will be nothing for tomorrow […]. We cannot sit 
with our hands folded”. 334 
 
This was therefore one of the rare times where the interests of the members of 
the AU coincided with one of its ‘raisons d’etre’: the making of peace. One must 
recognise however, that the fulfilment of these motivations had largely been 
aided by on the one hand, the insatiable pressure of the rest of the international 
community. On the other, the eventual acceptance of the mediation efforts by the 
conflicting parties made the AUs job easier, especially with Kibaki’s acceptance 
of mediation, but only with an ‘African solution’. Despite the fact that this was 
most likely due to his belief that such an intervention would leave him better off 
than one by the UN or Western states, it still legitimised the AU’s mediation. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the internationalisation of the mediation of 
Kenya can be explained by three main factors. Firstly, the need for a third party 
mediation was recognised by Odinga’s need to shift the balance of power if he 
were to achieve an acceptable outcome, and by Kibaki eventually recognising the 
excessive costs of escalated violence. Secondly, the immediate attention of the 
international community was driven by its many vested interests in Kenya. The 
geo-strategic position of the country had made it the home of many IOs and 
NGOs, and its stability was paramount for the continuation of their activities. 
Kenya further represented the perfect opportunity for peace groups and the 
humanitarian community to ‘show-off’, and to sell their ideals. Lastly, the AUs 
surprising unity and willingness to intervene in the domestic affairs of one of its 
member states, can be explained by the convergence of two needs. On the one 
hand, the Kenyan case provided an opportunity for the organisation to remain 
legitimate and be recognised as valuable both on the continent and 
internationally. On the other, Kenya’s geo-strategic location and its position as 
the economic powerhouse in one of the poorest regions of the world meant that 
its stability was in the interest of most member states of the AU. This resulted in 
a situation where all actors would benefit in the immediate resolution of the 
conflict, whose democratic process would have mattered little.  
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Chapter 5 Kenya’s Way 
 
This chapter will explore how Kenya ended up with the KNDR and its 
promises of accountability by looking at the mediation process and the features 
that allowed retributive justice to be incorporated. Three topics will be 
discussed: mediation strategies, wording and interpretation of the KNDR, and 
the legacies of the past. These will help answer the seemingly paradoxical choice 
that the Kenyan governing elite made by setting up CIPEV. 
 
It is important to note that Kenya is in two ways not a typical TJ case.335 Firstly, 
the TJ process was chosen during the mediation, when the two opposing parties 
were not only attempting to put an end to violence, but also trying to find ways 
to govern as one unit. Secondly, Kenya did not experience war or a complete 
break from the past. No regime was taken over and no long running conflict was 
ended. Because of this peculiar situation, most of the actors involved before, and 
during the election violence, were engaged in the negotiations and are still 
present in the government today.336  
 
However, Kenya had been emerging from 20 years of repression under KANU. 
Whilst as we have seen it can be argued that this lessened under Kibaki, full-
fledged competitive democracy had not been achieved and Kenya was a 
restricted democracy at best. For patrimonialism to be so widespread, 
corruption was a daily affair, with most of the population in one way or another 
complicit. As with Eastern Europe under communism, although state violence 
was significantly less serious in Kenya, the population participated in the day-to-
day corruption of their government. Additionally, the transition was also 
instigated by electoral violence. As opposed to a civil war where the majority of 
the population is involved for a protracted time, the PEV lasted two months with 
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clear acts of murder and extrajudicial killings, and with clearly identifiable 
perpetrators.  
 
 Thus, Kenya is a state that since 2002 has been emerging from a regime of 
criminality; but with the election violence, perpetrators and instigators of that 
violence can clearly be identified. As we have seen, the balance of power still 
weighs toward a strong former regime that would do anything to avoid reforms 
and prosecutions. It is therefore unlikely that Kenya would have willingly 
‘jumped on the justice wagon’ and more likely, that it would try to hijack it. 
However, on the surface, Kenya would seem to be an exception to the rule, as 
those who had called for mass-action and planned the PEV, were also the same 
individuals who called for a TJ process with an accountability component. 
Because of this apparent paradox, Kenya’s situation begs the question as to why 
the GNU would have agreed to Annan’s four point agenda.  
 
5.1 Mediation Strategies 
5.1.1 A Paradox 
 
The mediation process began on the 22nd of January three weeks after the 
PEV erupted. It was to last forty-one days. First, an important factor in 
establishing a TJ process as part of this mediation was the individual who led it, 
and his expertise in designing mediation strategies. Annan stands out as 
mediator due to his strong commitment to human rights ideals, such as his role 
in the formulation of the Responsibility to Protect, explaining why TJ tools were 
included in his mediation. The Kenyan case is a good example of the growing 
international interest in including TJ to mediation, which, as will be seen, can be 
a form of intervention. It also reflects the current understanding in TJ 
scholarship that a combination of mechanisms must be used, both restorative 
and retributive.  
 
In his strategy to include TJ mechanisms in the mediation process, Annan 
separated the short-term issues from the long-term issues. Because the main 
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challenges for the disputing parties were the short-term issues of ending the 
violence and of power-sharing, meant that the longer-term issues did not receive 
as much attention, as they seemed less important at the time.337 Additionally, as 
Elster shows, an even-handed treatment of both parties is essential when dealing 
with power-sharing arrangements338. Had Annan allowed for either party to 
emerge victorious, would have risked a return to violence. Allowing for the 
prospect of TJ, which would investigate the violence in all communities, power 
sharing was made a political possibility. Furthermore, by ensuring that there 
would be only one mediation team, and keeping the process inclusive and 
transparent, Annan created a double-edged sword. The pressure from below and 
above reinforced the urgent need to find a peaceful solution, allowing Annan to 
‘slip in’ principles of TJ.339  
 
5.1.2 Mediation: Wording 
 
An important feature that allowed accountability measures to be included 
was the vague wording of the KNDR. While the agreement underscored a 
consensus to ‘deal’ with the injustices of the past, there was little consensus on 
how this would be achieved. The agreement provided for broad reforms and 
measures, but with no agreement on which TJ mechanisms would be chosen, 
how these would be deployed, and how they would fit within the constitutional 
and institutional reforms proposed.340 Concerning measures for accountability, 
Agenda 4 took two, almost competing resolutions. On the one hand, Kenya was to 
establish a TJRC that would make recommendations for accountability, as well as 
prescribe the granting of unconditional amnesty for violations of human rights, 
except international crimes, for the past 40 years. However, CIPEV was also to 
make recommendations for measures to bring individuals to accountability. 
Musila argues that the TJRC’s mandate might obfuscate possibilities for legal 
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accountability, as its role in the larger context of the TJ process was unclear, with 
little prescriptions on how it would relate to the question of accountability.341  
 
A third aspect to consider is the parties’ interpretation of this agreement. In view 
of past efforts at accountability and Kenya’s numerous failed commissions, one 
could see how the governing elite may have expected the same outcome from 
CIPEV. In addition, both parties of the new coalition would have wanted to 
differentiate themselves from the previous regime, in order to gain credibility 
and legitimacy. They would have made the calculation that a degree of 
accountability would help achieve this goal. The PNU’s support for investigations 
would be its way to confirm that the PEV had been caused by the ODM’s call for 
mass action. Members of government may have thought it possible to manipulate 
the commission to serve their political interests, or destroy the commission 
altogether with enough political interference. In this light, it is likely that the 
vagueness of the accountability process was deliberate. At the very least, it 
helped convince the parties that the accountability process would be easily 
influenced. Holding control over the judiciary, PNU would have taken the risk of 
including accountability, if convinced of the partiality and loyalty of a judicial 
system that already worked in its favour.342 On the other hand, the ODM would 
want to posit itself as ‘reformers’, those working toward democracy and justice. 
Samwel Mohochi writes that the decision to integrate a justice agenda in the 
KNDR can be seen as belonging to the ‘ping pong blame game’.343 Mohochi 
warned that this would continue in the GNU, and that TJ tools could be 
manipulated to serve this game.344 
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5.2 Legacies of the Past 
 
Kasfir argues that in order to understand how the compromise was 
reached, and the subsequent difficulties of the power sharing arrangement, one 
must take into account the legacies left by the former regime and how they 
helped tame the fears of retribution for the PEV.345 The author argues that 
clientelist calculations shaped the strategy throughout the negotiations, and 
explains why the outcome was agreeable for both parties. Concurringly, Klopp 
states that because the accord entrenched the key culprits of the PEV into 
government, the agreement worked by using the lure of joint access to the state 
resources.346  The arrangement made for the power sharing was to split 
ministerial roles equally between both parties. This resulted in the largest and 
most incoherent cabinet Kenya had ever had, as posts were created in order to 
reward key players of both parties.347 The inclusion of the former regime in the 
new power sharing government, would have further entrenched their belief in 
their own safety from prosecutions, as, in Kenya political power is equated with 
impunity.  
 
Therefore, we have seen that the inclusion of TJ in the KNDR was not a sign of 
the unequivocal acceptance of justice. It was however the result of a number of 
other factors. First, it was helped by the intervention and mediation strategy led 
by Annan, one of the most well known proponents of human rights. Secondly, the 
ambiguity and vagueness of how the process would unfold allowed the political 
elite to believe that the process could be manipulated to serve their interests. In 
view of Kenya’s history with commissions of enquiries, this is not too hard to 
believe. This time, it would be motivated by the need to put on a show of wanting 
to end impunity in order to achieve legitimacy by blaming the other or by posing 
as reformers. Lastly, the structure of the GNU kept much of the system of 
governance intact, allowing and encouraging patrimonialism as means of gaining 
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loyalty: a quality that would be much needed in a government made up of as 
many foes as friends. 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
One cannot separate the TJ process from its political and economic 
context. In Kenya, this context brings to light much of the politicking that went 
on behind closed doors. The mediation took place within deeply entrenched 
politics of clientelism and impunity, with the balance of power weighted toward 
those supporting that system. The imperative for the political elite to safeguard 
their position of power deeply affected the way they perceived the process of 
accountability, as well as their reactions to it. We have seen that, the paradox 
that is Kenya’s pursuit of accountability can be explained by a number of political 
factors that do not consider the moral need for ending impunity.  
 
For the international community and Annan, accountability would allow the 
formation of a politically acceptable power sharing government that would build 
its credibility domestically and abroad.348 It also served to show that TJ is a 
process that works, and is a worthwhile enterprise. 
 
For the incoming party (ODM), it provided the opportunity to set itself apart 
from the previous regime, as well as from the PNU, by presenting itself as the just 
and unspoilt party in the GNU. It also enabled the old regime (PNU) to shift some 
of the blame onto the ODM for participating in abuses of human rights, and to 
justify its own actions in the face of the assault led by ODM. Furthermore, it 
provided the opportunity to distinguish itself from the mistakes of the past 
regimes. As explained in chapter three, this was further aided by the fluid party 
system, as by switching parties the incumbent can “conceal individual 
responsibility behind the collective reputation of the new party”.349  
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Secondly, the accountability process was created with the perception that it was 
a vague and distant idea, which would be unlikely to come to fruition. One can 
see how the vagueness and lack of a detailed plan of how these processes would 
work together and establish accountability would have led the parties to believe 
they would find loopholes in the system. Hence, as we have seen, CIPEV was 
possibly created in the view that it would be easily destroyed or manipulated.  
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Chapter 6 The International Criminal Court 
 
In this final chapter, we will take a closer look at CIPEV, its 
recommendations and the reactions of members of government to it. This will 
help to explain how three of Kenya’s political elite and a radio broadcaster are 
now awaiting trial at the ICC. We will first take a brief look at the timeline of 
events following the publishing of CIPEVs report. This will show the back and 
forth politicking that took place away from the public’s eye, and will highlight 
that the motives of many individuals for being for or against the Special Tribunal, 
had little to do with ending impunity. However, despite the recognition of 
politically driven decision making, this thesis rejects the hypothesis that either of 
the parties were able to use the Commission to fix political opponents.  
 
The second section will provide an analysis of the motives and reasons behind 
these political positions, and indicate who stood to benefit from certain 
outcomes and why. It will be argued that when CIPEV released its 
recommendations, the GNU had not expected such strong measures for 
accountability. Whilst unforeseen and politically detrimental to the GNU, the 
special tribunal recommendation and the potential involvement of the ICC also 
provided for new political opportunities. It will be seen how the justice process 
was marred by attempts from both parties to shape it to favour their credentials 
for the 2013 elections, as well as to be protected from retribution. 
 
6.1 Failure to Establish the Special Tribunal 
 
As seen in the introduction of this thesis, in October 2008 CIPEV’s Report 
established that the GNU was to set up a Special Tribunal composed of both local 
and international experts to try those who bore greatest responsibility for the 
PEV. In order to ensure compliance, the report was accompanied by a sunset 
clause which stated that if the Kenyan government failed to establish a Special 
Tribunal by the 30th September 2009, a list of names given to Annan by CIPEV for 
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confidential keeping would be sent to the Prosecutor of the ICC.350 On the 16th of 
December, the GNU signed an agreement to fully implement the Waki Report. 
This section will highlight the numerous attempts of the GNU at establishing the 
ST, their failures, and the actions that led to Ocampo’s decision to exercise his 
proprio motu powers.  
 
As CIPEV handed in the report to the government, it was immediately published 
as stipulated by the KNDR. The commission called for the parties to recognise the 
report and sign an agreement stating that its recommendations would be 
implemented.351 The Waki report was received by MPs with contempt, especially 
by hardliners from both the ODM and PNU.352 There was much controversy 
surrounding the report, and many called foul play. CIPEV was accused of having 
gone beyond its mandate, of being speculative and relying too heavily on the 
NGO the Kenyan Human Rights Commission.  
 
Despite local accusations, most have recognised CIPEV as having been 
transparent and unbiased. While there have been rumours of fixing, as of yet 
these remain unfounded. As stipulated by its mandate, CIPEV’s chair, Judge 
Philip Waki was chosen by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, in 
consultation with PNU and ODM. 353  It would seem that the punitive 
recommendations of CIPEV came as a surprise to both Kenya and the 
international community. For instance, before the reports’ publication, the US 
Ambassador had warned his government not to be overly optimistic of CIPEV, as 
he feared Kenya had ‘caught commission fever’.354 Additionally, Miguna Miguna 
states, “It is crystal clear that the ODM was not formally involved in the ICC 
proceedings at all, nor did any “outside forces” intervene on the party’s behalf. Had 
that happened, no senior ODM member would or could have been investigated and 
                                                        
350
 CIPEV, “Final Report.” 
351
 Okuta, “National Legislation.”  
352
 Brown and Sriram, “The big fish won’t fry themselves.” 
353
 CIPEV, “Final Report.” 
354
 Michael Ranneberger, former US Ambassador to Kenya, “Update On Commission Of Inquiry 
Into Post-election Violence And Commission For Truth, Justice, And Reconciliation” (May 7, 2008) 
Wikileaks, 08NAIROBI1170, accessed July 15, 2012, 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08NAIROBI1170&q=commission%20election%20post
%20violence. 
Kenya and the ICC 
 80 
indicted. In addition, those alleging “political interference” haven’t credibly 
substantiated their claims.”355 One can assume that the recommendation of 
setting up a special tribunal with its accompanying sunset clause was unforeseen 
by the parties. 
 
Despite the controversy that CIPEV caused, the GNU still decided to sign the 
agreement thus committing itself to a transparent accountability process. What 
may have had an enormous influence on Kibaki and Odinga to sign the 
agreement was international pressure. There was much diplomatic pressure 
from the US.356 However, perhaps the more persistent actor was the EU. The 
latter’s Head of Delegation, Eric Van der Linden and French Ambassador, 
Elisabeth Barbier, asked the GNU to immediately accept both the Kriegler 
Commission and CIPEV recommendations. The EU, which is also the largest 
donor bloc for Kenya, stated that if Kenya refused to accept the implementation 
of these reports, the EU would cease giving Kenya grants.357 Acceptance of the 
commissions was a non-negotiable basic condition that Kenya had to meet, if it 
wished to continue receiving aid money. Barbier stated that if Kenya accepted 
the commissions, the EU would fund development projects with approximately 
400 million euro for the next five years.358 In light of the economic condition of 
Kenya, which in 2008 had a budget deficit of 5.3 billion shillings, and whose 
economy was expected to plummet, it may not be as surprising that the GNU felt 
compelled to sign the agreement.359 The GNU officially stated that it was 
committed to follow through with accountability measures, and cited the need to 
end impunity. 
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In order to establish the ST, Kenya needed to implement legislation that would 
allow the country to prosecute for international crimes. This required two pieces 
of legislation: a bill entitled ‘The Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill’ and a 
Constitutional Amendment Bill to ensure that the Special Tribunal would not 
breach the Kenyan Constitution.360 When the Constitutional amendment bill was 
introduced on 12th February 2009, it failed to garner the required two-thirds 
majority of votes. Both President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga were 
pressurising the government to sign the bill. They promised Annan they would 
reintroduce an improved draft, and Annan granted two successive extensions.361  
 
Failing that, on the 3rd July 2009, the Government sent a delegation to the ICC to 
discuss the Kenyan situation with the ICC Prosecutor. It was agreed that if by 
September Kenya had not committed itself to establishing the ST, Kenya should 
refer itself to the ICC. In the meantime, CIPEV and Annan sent boxes of evidence 
and the secret envelope to Ocampo. On 31st July 2009, the government 
announced that the suspects would be dealt with through the local courts and 
the TJRC. Prime Minister Odinga stated that the “Defeat of the government bill is 
only a temporary setback. The government is still determined to set up a local 
tribunal. Those pushing for The Hague option are merely delaying justice”.362  
 
The TJRC however refused to do so as it would require the alteration of its 
mandate. Ocampo visited Kenya and announced that since there was no proof 
that the country had undertaken serious measures to try suspects, he would ask 
the ICC to start investigating.363 Later that month there was a last attempt at 
having the ST established, as MP Gitobu Imanyara introduced another revised 
bill. The government officially supported this bill, but it was never debated in 
Parliament. Thus, on 26th November, Ocampo requested authorisation to open an 
investigation into the alleged crimes and their perpetrators for the PEV since 
Kenya had not shown a commitment to judicial proceedings, and refused to refer 
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itself to the ICC.364 On 31st March 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC declared 
that Ocampo should be allowed to investigate into the Kenyan situation. The ICC 
released the names of six suspects on the 15th of December 2010.  
 
A few days after the release of the names of the suspects, Parliament passed a 
(non-binding) motion to withdraw Kenya from the ICC. The motion was however 
dropped, as a withdrawal from the ICC would not protect the PEV, and would 
portray Kenya as a pariah state in the international community.365 While the AU 
did not endorse this proposal to defect from the Rome Statute, it did attempt to 
help Kenya pressure the UN and Security Council to ask the ICC for an extension 
in order to establish local courts. However, with the UK and the US stating that 
they would not grant any more extensions, that avenue was exhausted.366 Later, 
on 31st March 2011, Kenya filed an application challenging the admissibility of 
the cases, on the basis that the ICC did not have jurisdiction for the PEV-cases. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber II and later the Appeals Chamber however rejected the 
admissibility challenge, stating that no credible information had been provided 
to show that Kenya was investigating the ICC suspects.367 
 
In the end, four years after the PEV, Kenya was facing an accountability process, 
involving the highest criminal court in the world. It has been shown from the 
reactions of various members of the government as well as that of the 
international community that the parties did not expect the harsh 
recommendations of CIPEV. Many of the political elite within Kenya attempted to 
convince the GNU leaders that CIPEV had gone beyond its mandate and that its 
recommendations should not be tabled. While it would have been easier to 
completely reject CIPEV, Odinga and Kibaki also had to handle domestic and 
international pressure. The EU threat of removing all aid to Kenya might very 
well have been a decisive factor. Once the initial agreement had been signed, 
there were many attempts at stopping or at the very least delaying the justice 
process.  
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6.2 Actors and their Interests 
 
Since there is an apparent dichotomy between what the Kenyan leaders 
publicly stated and what their actual efforts in establishing the Special Tribunal 
were, it is important to look at who the actors in favour or against the ST and/or 
the ICC are, and for what reasons. A number of hypotheses can be derived from 
this situation. First, the members of the GNU that delayed the process genuinely 
did not want to set up the Special Tribunal, as they believed proper justice could 
only be done at The Hague. Second, these actors believed that Kenya would be 
able to thwart the ICC, and thus voting against the ST would help the country 
avoid any form of accountability. Third, some of these actors preferred the ICC 
process, not to end impunity but rather to get rid of certain members of 
government. This section will look at which of these hypotheses is most likely, 
for whom and for what reasons.  
  
As government signed the agreement that accepted CIPEVs’ recommendations, 
many MPs officially stated that they were for the ST, but later voted against the 
bill. Many stated that their main reason for voting against it was that they did not 
believe in the capacity of Kenya to try its own governing elite due to a biased 
judiciary. For instance, William Ruto had strongly opposed any attempts at 
having the ST established; “Kofi Annan should hand over the envelope that 
contains names of suspects to the International Criminal Court at The Hague so 
that proper investigations can start”.368 Some have noted the irony of the 
situation, as Ruto later turned out to be on Ocampo’s list. Since then, he has been 
one of the most outspoken MPs against the ICC. He denounced the ICC as having 
been politicised by Odinga, arguing that Ocampo was following the Prime 
Minister’s requests.369 Many other Members of Parliament, including Lewis 
Nguyai, Isaac Ruto and Ekwe Ethuro, had also initially showed their preference 
for the ICC. However, when the names of the six suspects were released, these 
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MPs changed their minds.370 This divided the ODM as Ruto and his allies defected 
and made an alliance with Uhuru Kenyatta, to oppose Odinga.  
 
Furthermore, it has been noted that those indicted by the ICC have excluded 
many of the bigger names of Kenya’s political elite, such as the President and 
Prime Minister. However, the panic caused amongst all involved shows how even 
seeing the ‘smaller fish’ on the way to court, is cause for worry for the rest, as the 
ones standing trial may well give away the names of many others. This also 
explains the rallying of men behind the indicted.  
 
It is interesting to note that a Wikileaks cable dated 4th November 2008, written 
by US ambassador Michael Ranneberger, already speculates; “Ruto is almost 
certainly on the Waki Commission list, and considered by many Kenyans to be the 
instigator of PEV”.371 According to the cable, Ruto had threatened a return to 
violence if either the ICC or the Special Tribunal were invoked in parliament.372 
Another cable also shows that both the US and some in Kenya also suspected 
Uhuru Kenyatta to be on the Waki list.373 The latter was by then already paving 
his way to the 2013 Presidency. Accordingly, Kenyatta’s appointment as Minister 
of Finance by Kibaki was widely seen as an endorsement of Kenyatta as his 
successor. Kenyatta had submitted a new enlarged budget to Parliament, 
designated for the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). The CDF, if used 
transparently could have been used to kick-start the economy, but was feared by 
the US Ambassador to have been mobilised to increase support with 
parliamentarians and ensure that a ST would not be voted in.374  
 
The US Ambassador noted that those opposed to the ST understood that if the 
ICC would get involved, it was likely to take years to investigate. The delay would 
thus favour the suspects, as a ST would likely be much faster and thus put a quick 
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end to their political careers.375 Brown and Sriram also support this analysis, as 
they state that the “shadow of the ICC was too small”. They further argue that the 
‘big fish’ in Kenya would never willingly give themselves up to prosecutions.376 
As seen previously, protecting their party members from the ICC is as important 
as protecting themselves.  
 
On the other hand, many have noted that Odinga, who had originally appeared to 
be opposed to the ICC trials, later became a strong supporter of the ICC once the 
names of the suspects had been made public. For instance, ODM Secretary 
General Anyang Nyong’o who is an ally of Odinga’s, sent a letter to the UN 
Security Council on behalf of ODM, urging the Security Council not to allow for a 
deferral of the ICC cases as had been requested by the PNU side of the 
government.377 Odinga stands much to benefit with the ICC’s involvement, as it 
removes two of his major opponents for the 2013 elections. As a result, Ruto 
defected from the ODM in February of 2009, making an alliance with Uhuru, and 
joining other PNU hardliners in an attempt to side line Odinga and his allies. 378 
Many in Kenya see this as proof that Odinga has had a hand to play in the 
involvement of the ICC, and accuse Odinga of fixing the indictment of Ruto and 
Kenyatta. This seems to be partly supported by a Wikileaks cable, which notes 
that Kibaki and Odinga both had met with other parliamentarians and were 
present for the vote on the draft bill to establish the ST, this may have been a 
‘window dressing strategy’ as there had been no strong behind-the-scene 
push.379 Additionally, Miguna states that the Prime Minister “consistently told me 
how much he hoped and prayed that Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto were 
confirmed, tried and convicted at The Hague. […]”380 The author concludes that 
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Odinga publicly pretended to support the ST but in fact supported the Hague 
option, not for reasons of justice, but in order to remove his political rivals.381  
 
What is however more likely and what the Wikileaks cables seem to support, is 
that once the report and the envelope had been written, the names of those on 
the list, were not so secret after all.382 From that point forward, it would have 
been easy for Odinga to manipulate the justice process and use the ICC as a tool 
to get rid of his political rivals. With so many in parliament being against the ST, 
ironically form the help of Ruto and Kenyatta themselves, Odinga was able to 
appear to be pushing for the ST. Odinga would also have seen, based on his own 
dealings with Annan and members of the international community, that they 
were unlikely to let go of the Kenya case. Furthermore, it would have looked bad 
for the ICC not to go through with investigations, as it would have further 
discredited the Court, already in danger of losing legitimacy beyond European 
borders. Thus, Odinga might have calculated that if he appeared to be in favour 
of the ST, he would gain legitimacy, while knowing that the likelihood of the 
involvement of the ICC was high.383  
 
Therefore, Odinga used the need to reform the Kenyan governing system as a 
way to hide his personal interests. While he did not make the choice of 
mechanism for the accountability process, it provided him with the opportunity 
to side line his political opponents. While Odinga has since the end of the one 
party state been the prominent figure calling for reforms, it is also important to 
recognise that he had worked under KANU and is ‘an old school politician’ widely 
recognised in Kenya as being particularly cunning. Thus, while possibly wanting 
some reforms and political accountability, it is unlikely that he would have been 
so encouraging of the process, would he not have benefited from it.384 On the 
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other hand, politicians such as Ruto, who had initially proclaimed their 
commitment to justice, which in turn could only be achieved through The Hague, 
had no interest in seeing the end of impunity.  
 
The high likelihood for some of them to appear on the Secret List ironically made 
them believe that they would be safe if the Special Tribunal was not set up. While 
publicly supporting the ICC, these actors would have applied pressure on the 
GNU to thwart its involvement in Kenya. Moreover, the belief that any ICC 
involvement would take years at best would have convinced them of their safety. 
This largely reflects the short-term view many Kenyan politicians have 
concerning politics, seeking immediate power as a means to escape 
accountability.  
 
This takes us to the role of the international community. Odinga’s election in 
2013, with him belonging to the Luo ethnic group, was increasingly seen not only 
as likely, but also as preferable.385 His election would potentially take away the 
problems of Kikuyu domination, which was increasingly seen in Kenya’s 
business elite and in the US as a “recipe for serious instability”, which held the 
potential for a more dangerous breakdown than in 2007.386 The election of 
Odinga with a clear win would likely appease ethical tensions in the country. 387 
This could further explain the international community’s support of the ICC 
cases in Kenya, and the Security Council’s refusal to allow for a deferral of the 
cases, as requested by the Kenyan government. It is un-doubtful that in their 
view a complete democratic transition in Kenya first demanded accountability. 
However, a second order motivation may also have been the belief that Odinga 
would be the best man to lead the country, as he would at least bring stability. 
This explains the international community’s continued support for the ICC and 
their refusal to allow for a deferral of the cases. The quicker the ICC cases would 
be dealt with, the surer Odinga’s win against Kenyatta and Uhuru.  
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6.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored four hypotheses:  
 Hypothesis 1: CIPEV, with the ICC clause, was created to fix political 
opponents. 
 Hypothesis 2:  the politicians standing against the establishment of the ST 
genuinely believed that only the ICC could deliver justice. 
 Hypothesis 3: Many did not believe the ICC would get involved, thus 
stopping the ST from being set up, would ensure that no accountability 
process would be undertaken.  
 Hypothesis 4: Some actors preferred the ICC process, as it would remove 
certain political opponents.  
 
The justice process of Kenya has been far from straightforward. From an analysis 
of the reactions of certain actors and their interests, one may conclude that 
although it may have appeared as if the government genuinely wanted to end 
impunity, this hypothesis has been rejected. The first hypothesis has also been 
rejected, as it would have required access and influence over CIPEV. However, 
impunity was not a major priority at the time for anyone. For those who, in 
reality stood in the anti-reformist camp, it was purely a desperate attempt at 
avoiding the process. For others it provided a perfect opportunity to ensure their 
political ambitions. The justice process was therefore used and manipulated to 
serve narrow political goals, marking a continuation of the system of governance 
that has been described in this thesis.  
 
For the international community, Kenya has provided the perfect opportunity to 
‘market’ its ideals of justice, asserting Africa's need to end its pervasive impunity. 
The hypocrisy of this notion has been noted herewith, especially with regards to 
the ICC, which ignores the international crimes of the states that support it. 
Furthermore, the ICC has not only been used as a tool to fix political opponents 
in Kenya, but has also become the key issue around which political coalitions and 
partnerships have been formed. This is to the detriment of a true democratic 
process whereby parties’ form based on similar ideologies and policies, rather 
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than on the need to garner the votes of certain ethnic constituencies or of having 
a common enemy to defeat. The invocation of achieving accountability through 
an internationally supervised body and the use of the ICC as a guarantee for 
justice, has in fact, been detrimental to Kenya’s democratic transformation. It has 
resulted in further fragmentation of political parties and of the opposition. This 
will mean that the 2013 elections, as is slowly becoming apparent, will be 
shrouded in secrecy, conspiracy theories and the legacies of the PEV, rather than 
on the need to move Kenya’s politics away from patronage, ethnicity and the 
maintenance of the former regime.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
What were the politics that led Kenya to prosecute those who bore greatest 
responsibility for the PEV? What were the politics that resulted in the ICC being the 
court where individuals were going to be held accountable? 
 
When states transit from war, authoritarianism or restricted democracy, 
the choice to bring perpetrators of past crimes to accountability depends on the 
convergence of a number of factors.  These are: the degree of cooperation with 
the previous regime, the legacies left behind by the previous regime (the balance 
of power in the new government), and finally elite preferences (relationships 
with various constituencies and motivations). When the international 
community imposes retributive justice while these factors are not aligned, states 
will devise strategies to avoid accountability. This will be done by either 
compromising to please all sides (usually by establishing Truth Commissions) or 
by ‘hijacking’ the justice process.  
 
This thesis has posited that to understand Kenya’s accountability process, one 
cannot dissociate it from its political context. It has been seen that Kenya’s 
transition was peculiar in that it took place after a relatively short-lived period of 
post-electoral violence, with identifiable perpetrators and victims. Peace was 
achieved via a negotiated settlement between the fighting parties, creating a 
government of national unity. The GNU included much of the former regime in 
the new government, with the balance of power strongly tilted in their favour. 
Additionally, Kenya’s leaders have historically shown to prefer impunity to 
accountability in order to sustain political careers.  
 
In light of this, one would not normally expect retributive justice to be attempted 
in Kenya’s transition. What one would expect to see is a compromised transition 
– i.e. with only restorative justice and a Truth Commission, or an attempt by the 
political elite to hijack the process. Surprisingly however, Kenya appeared to be 
strongly in favour of punitive accountability, so much so that the ICC became 
involved. This demonstrates the importance of asking what were the politics that 
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led to such a decision, and undertaking an extensive analysis of whether Kenya’s 
claim of wanting to end impunity reflected a genuine quest for justice.  
 
This thesis has thus provided an analysis of Kenya’s system of governance. 
Finding its roots in British indirect rule, this system can be characterised as 
politically fragmented, with parties dependent on ethnic constituencies, and a 
social-political relationship framed by patrimonialism. This system was 
perpetuated and accentuated under KANU’s one-party reign, which only ended 
in 2002 with NARC’s win. Kibaki, while opening up some of the political space, 
however did not change this system of patrimonialism and it remained as the 
background against which decision-making processes took place, resulting in 
Kenya becoming a restricted democracy at best. The combination of these factors 
led to a government that was made up of political parties concerned first and 
foremost with winning elections, political power and the perks that it provides, 
which in turn exacerbated ethnic competition, impunity and the maintenance of 
the status-quo.  
 
Therefore, by the 2007 elections, Kenya was in a politically volatile situation. The 
NARC had failed to utilise the democratic space created in 2002, the reformers 
had lost the battle to re-write the constitution and the institutions that allowed 
corruption and impunity to take place were left intact. Parties were highly 
fragmented, and once more in Kenyan history, defined by their ethnic 
constituencies, all waiting for their ‘turn to eat’. This resulted in a government 
largely concerned with the protection of its political elite and the status quo, over 
the concern for its citizens well being. With this in mind, it has been argued 
herewith that Kenya’s PEV and transition has two striking features: its 
internationalisation and the inclusion of an accountability process and the 
involvement of the ICC.  
 
As has been shown, the internationalisation of the post-PEV process can be 
explained by a number of variables. First, the escalation of violence combined 
with Odinga’s continued pressure, which pushed Kibaki to accept negotiations 
and international intervention. Secondly, Odinga’s sustained pressure was 
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caused by the recognition of the need to shift the balance of power to his favour, 
which could be achieved with the help of the international community. Thirdly, 
the international community, including the AU, recognised the importance of 
Kenya as its geo-strategic position had made it the gateway of NGOs and the UNs 
third largest headquarters. Kenya’s stability was thus paramount for the 
continuation of their activities. For the mediators themselves, it provided the 
opportunity to include and promote transitional justice.  
 
With regard to accountability, it has been argued that its inclusion in the 
transition was not a reflection of the political elite’s will to end impunity, but has 
rather been used as tool to be manipulated for political ends. CIPEV was not 
created in order to ‘fix’ Odinga’s political opponents. However, it was created in 
the view that accountability was a distant and vague idea that was unlikely to 
come to fruition. With Kenya’s history in mind, this should not come as a 
surprise. The wording of the KNDR, which allowed for ambiguity with regards to 
who would be investigated and how accountability would be undertaken, as well 
as the focus on the short-term and immediate problems that Kenya faced, 
furthered this impression. Hence, the PNU calculated that CIPEV would allow 
them to share the blame of the PEV with the ODM. The ODM, on the other hand, 
could use this process as a political platform in order to posit itself as the ‘new 
regime’ unsoiled by political corruption.  
 
Having seen that the inclusion of accountability was not intended to end 
impunity, this thesis turned to analysing what led to the failure to establish the 
Special Tribunal, allowing for the ICC’s involvement. CIPEV’s harsh 
recommendation was surprising to many, including the international 
community. The controversy that it created was understandable, but its 
acceptance by the President and Vice President was puzzling to many. However, 
the European Union’s ultimatum to Kenya: to cut aid as one of Kenya’s major 
donors, in the event of a refusal to table CIPEV’s recommendations, helps to 
make sense of the puzzle. The debate that followed within Kenya, which led to 
the failure to establish the Special Tribunal, was the result of the attempts from 
the actors involved, to shape the process to fit their interests.  
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In this regard, this thesis has supported two hypothesises. For some, such as 
Ruto and Kenyatta, supporting the ICC was based on the calculation that it would 
stop domestic prosecutions and buy time, as ICC proceedings would take years at 
best. For others, namely Odinga and his supporters, the strategy was to appear to 
support the Special Tribunal, to gain legitimacy domestically, and yet support the 
ICC option behind the scenes. This thesis has rejected the idea that justice was 
pursued genuinely, or that it was calculated and fixed from the outset, to ensure 
Odinga’s win in the next elections.  
 
We can therefore conclude that the ICC is vulnerable to being ‘hijacked’ for 
political ends in transitional justice processes. It can be used to serve and protect 
the interests of globally powerful states who use it as a tool to influence and 
direct international justice while at the same time being immune from it. 
Moreover, it can be utilised and manipulated by individuals within states under 
investigation, to remove political ‘hindrances’. The lessons derived herewith, are 
hoped to show the dangers and difficulties of imposing democratisation 
processes through the Western lens of justice. The Kenyan case may be one more 
example of the West’s obsession with its ideals of a ‘just society’ for the African 
continent, and the ease with which these ideals may be manipulated and 
subverted by all actors involved.  
 
The consequences of this unfolding of event and manipulation of justice will of 
course mostly be felt by Kenya itself. While toward the end of the one-party rule, 
the overthrow of the government was the main aim of political parties, today, the 
main aim of political parties has been to counter the weight of the ICC and 
protect as many culprits as possible. Not only is it likely that only a handful of the 
‘smaller fish will be fried’, but also that this situation will result in further 
fragmentation of parties and the continuation of patrimonialism as a means of 
acquiring power and protection. While the PEV was shocking enough to scare 
politicians, was it enough to stop ethnic outbidding? This seems unlikely, as 
already Kenyans as well as the international community are already looking to 
support Odinga in the 2013 elections, in part because he is not a Kikuyu. Thus 
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the international intervention, which imposed a process of judicial accountability 
onto a government that was not ready for it, impeded the democratic process of 
the country. 
  
In the words of Wangari Maathai “The greatest loss is in those who died, as well as 
the destruction of the goodwill and comradeship that Kenyans from a majority of 
micro-nations had for each other in 2002. It has yet to be recaptured.”388 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
388
 Maathai, The Challenge for Africa, 208.  
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